

MILITARY ILLUSTRATED

PAST & PRESENT

No.24

April/May 1990

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In the Bush:
Photographing
Third World
Wars

'The Battle of the Lions':
Adua, 1896

The Fighting
Queen, 1858

British
Dugouts
1914-18

Peninsula
Medal
Mystery

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Civil War Trained Bands

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Our cover illustration was taken by war photographer Jim Elloper during a UNITA advance in Angola early in 1989 — see interview p.38

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EDITORIAL

Our article on the disastrous battle of Adua, 1896, is contributed by writer and artist **Raffaele Ruggeri**, who was born in Bologna, Italy, in 1964 and still lives and works there. After specialising in Ancient Greek and Latin in high school he attended the city's Academy of Fine Arts; and for the past three years he's worked mainly as a designer of fabrics, with occasional graphic work for *Vogue* magazine. He has published a study of Italy's 19th/early 20th century African colonial wars in the 'De Brillo' series produced by Editrice Militare Italiana of Milan.

Errata

In 'MI' No.23, p.4, our note on contributor Laurent Miranze misspelled the film on which he worked with Louis Delphier which should, of course, have been 'Champ d'Honneur'.

Toy Collectors' Fairs

We are asked to note that the Cuffley Toy Collectors' Fair is to be held at Cuffley Hall, off Station Rd., Cuffley, Herts. on Thursday evenings 10 May, 5 July, 13 September and 15 November; and the Orpington Fair at Cuffion Halls, Crofton Rd., Orpington, Kent on Thursday evenings 12 April, 14 June, 9 August, 11 October, 13 December, in all cases



Raffaele Ruggeri

from 7.15 to 10.30 p.m.; military toys and toy soldiers will figure prominently.

Research request

Peter Birchall, Postal Buildings, Ash St., Windermere LA23 3EB, England is researching the Ammunition Inspectorate of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, including Bomb Disposal, from 1900 to 1990. He would be most grateful to hear from former Assistant Ammunition Examiners, ATS during the Second World War, or from anyone who filled such a post during National Service in the late 1940s; from anyone with information on the 1920-39 period; and from anyone with unusual incidents or anecdotes to recount, covering the whole period.

IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT

We are delighted to announce that from the next issue — 'MI' No.25, June 1990 — 'Military Illustrated' will be published

monthly. We hope that the increased frequency of publication will allow us to give more space to subjects such as military films, art, flags, medals and modelling as well as to our core articles on uniforms and equipment.

We also draw your attention to a new address for our subscription service, including orders for back issues and binders:

'Military Illustrated' Infonet

5 Riverpark Estate, Billet Lane, Berkhamstead, Herts HP4 1HL. We believe that mail orders will be dealt with faster and more efficiently than during the recent transitional period. Please note that our main address, for all editorial and trade correspondence, remains 5 Gerrard Street, London W1V 7LJ.

Please note new subscription rates listed on p.19. We would add that in September we shall be publishing a greatly enlarged special issue; retail buyers will pay an increased price for this issue only, but subscribers will receive it without extra charge (another good reason to consider subscribing...)

Existing subscribers will be advised in good time of the earlier expiry of their subscriptions due to the increased frequency of publication.



'MI' contributor Will Fowler has drawn our attention to this intriguing TASS photograph showing what the up-to-date Soviet KGB Frontier Guard is wearing this season. Sgt. Igor Narayenko of the Western Frontier District here models the latest camouflaged peaked cap. Previously, Frontier Guards have worn their grass green and light sand/grey camouflaged uniform with either a camouflaged hat, or the normal stiff service dress cap with the Frontier Guards' distinctive emerald green band. Since full colour green and gold collar and shoulder strap insignia are worn on the camouflage uniform, camouflage can hardly be the reason for adopting the new headgear in place of the SD cap, though perhaps the beret was felt insufficiently 'sharp' for an elite branch.

The old year finished with an unusual sale organised by Philip's of Chichester when the collection of military vehicles and military which had formed the Grange Military Museum at Holywell, North Wales was sold. The lots were extremely varied, ranging from a collection of World War II maps (£90) to a Thunderbolt Mk I surface-to-air missile for £260. Transport was represented by a range of vehicles from a RAF biplane at £65, a World War I horse-drawn ambulance wagon (£300) to a genuine World War II Jeep for £4,200. Artillery pieces included a World War I German 75mm mortar which sold for £1,900; and an early propeller-fused launch went for £50. More ordinary militaria included badges, a lot of various goggles (£110), a manikin dressed in a World War II private's uniform (£95), a Luftwaffe officer's cap (£150) and a Japanese officer's sword (£440).

Held on the heels of the New Year Wallis & Wallis held their first sale of militaria on 2 January. The sale included a fair number of books; and it is interesting to see that Kipling & King's two volume work on British headdress badges, accepted as being the standard reference, is climbing in value and now sells at around £40 a volume.

Pickelhaubes continue to do well, with a Customs officer's selling at £380; further, for an officer of the Prussian Infantry Reserve, realised £800. Less spectacular but certainly of interest to collectors and students was a late Victorian scaled pattern tropical helmet for British other ranks which sold for £150. For some time there was little or no interest in

the Indian Army, but it is pleasing to note that demand for such material is increasing: Indian army badges are creeping up in price, and an 11th Rajput pugger badge went for £50. Early British badges still command high prices, and gungary badges continue to sell well — e.g. £140 for an officer's of the Highland Light Infantry.

On the weapons side it is apparent that antique air weapons are becoming more and more collected; it may be that the current oppressively restrictive laws on firearms have some bearing on this change. A boxed Webley Mark I .177 air pistol with an original box of slugs realised £180. A RAF officer's sword of the current reign went for £550 — an unusually high price for such an item; but the top price went for a pair of gunner's calipers. These shot and charge measures always sell well, and this one was unusual in bearing the marks of the Honourable East India Company, which helped push the price up to £690.

Later in the month Bonham's held their annual sale of militaria and, encouraged by the success of this one, a second sale is being considered for later in the year. The descriptions of the lots in the catalogue seem somewhat brief and this may well discourage postal bidders although they ran, of course, always telephone for fuller descriptions. A Waterloo medal of the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards went for £280, but there were plenty of items selling for much less.

THE AUCTION SCENE

This is encouraging, as it means that collectors of limited means can still hope to acquire some items at figures within their price range. A Rifle Brigade officer's sword together with medals and swagger stick sold for £110, and a good 17th century mourning sword for £530. In the uniform section an unusual Moroccan uniform of Gen. Sir Harry Maclean realised £320. A 5th (Royal Irish) Dragoons' tschupka sold for £420, and at the lower end a Walsley helmet made a modest £45. A cuirass of the 1st Life Grenadiers easily doubled the estimate and realised £800; and a Japanese battle flag went to £95, nearly four times the estimate.

Earlier the same day Christie's, South Kensington held a big sale of 313 lots of good, mixed militaria ranging from paintings by Michael Angelo Hayes — *A Detachment of the Black Watch* — at £350, to a rare helmet of 'The Honourable Corps of Gentlemen or Arms' at £2,300. In the edged weapons section examples of the Fairbairn Sykes World War II fighting knife did well at £190 and £160. Interestingly, three swordsticks were sold in one lot for £190, although these were antique — one had a silver knive which was hall-marked for 1882. Had this been for 1892 it could not have been sold; since it would have been less than 100 years old it could not be accepted as an antique and would therefore be a prohibited weapon under the Criminal Justice Act. (It is of incidental

interest to note that the 100-year 'antique' ruling is used for this Art, but does not apply to firearms...)

Our slightly unusual lot was a Victorian pipe-banner of the Scots Guards which sold for £240. However, things seem not to be at the top of the list; a Victorian side-drum made only £110, and a German example from World War I sold for £90. One of our most unusual items of all must be the small bannier with which the Kaiser nailed the colours of a pioneer unit to the staff, which had been carefully mounted on a plaque and sold for £240. The total lots sold amounted to 93% of the sale.

As always it is interesting to speculate on the coming auction scene, even if it is rather pointless since the market is notoriously variable. Will high interest rates, or relaxed conditions in East Europe, affect the supply of good quality pieces on the market and — most important — will demand for arms and armour rise? There are some very important sales on the horizon, and Sotheby's have some potential winners: on 23 April there is to be a big sale in their Monaco rooms made up of several private collections of quality French material, including swords and other weapons of the First Empire. Some items will probably be exhibited in London prior to the sale. In July the first part of one of the world's finest private collections, mainly of firearms and edged weapons, will be auctioned in London. The catalogues of both should prove worth keeping even if the prices may well be beyond the pocket of most collectors.

Frederick Wilkinson

ON THE SCREEN

Vidco Releases to Rent:

- 'The Stick' (Parkfield: 15)
'The Siege of Firebase Gloria' (Sony: 15)
'War Story 2' (Odyssey: 15)
'The Last Platoon' (VPD: 18)
'Rainbow in the Thunder' (Buena Vista: PG)

According to publicity, the title of Darrell Roodt's *The Stick* is a term referring to a small detachment of soldiers. The film begins with the massacre of a patrol of native guerrillas. In retaliation, a 'stick' of seven white soldiers and a black tracker are air-lifted by helicopter across an unidentified border to 'search and destroy' those responsible. The lieutenant (Frank Dabrowsky) is unable to maintain discipline within his command. The questioning of vil-

lagers leads to a needless massacre, an act which precipitates the influence of supernatural forces, with the hunters both becoming the hunted and turning on each other. No country is mentioned in the film, which is primarily intended as an allegory on the nature of war. However, director Daniel Roodt has evidently drawn on his own experiences as a conscript in the South African army, and the film's message has led to it being banned in its home country. The film's high quality and serious treatment of its theme is attested by the fact it was screened at the World Film Festival in Montreal (in competition), the Moscow Film Festival, and last November's London Film Festival.

Brian Trenchard-Smith's *The Siege of Firebase Gloria* (1988) is an Australian film set during the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam. R. Lee Erney plays the experienced US Marine Corps Sergeant-Major Hafner who is leading a long-range reconnaissance patrol. Large Viet Cong troop movements are much in evidence, and the patrol barely succeeds in reaching the comparative safety of 'Firebase Gloria'. As the Firebase's CO is suffering from delusions, Hafner takes command; assisted by Sergeant DiNardo (Wings Hauser), he sets about improving the defences in anticipation of an attack. Meanwhile a regular Viet Cong regiment, led by Colonel Cao Van, is massing for a determined assault.

Characterisation is thin, but real-life Vietnam veteran R. Lee Erney (memorable in Kubrick's *Full Metal Jacket*), who is credited with 'additional dialogue', lends some authority to the crucial role of Hafner. The film commendably spends some time exploring the Viet Cong's point of view. Robert Arevalo is effective as the VC colonel who appreciates that the Tet Offensive has been engineered by the North Vietnamese to ensure the destruction of the Viet Cong and clear the way for their takeover of the conduct of the war. However, the most memorable aspects of the film are several large-scale battle sequences, for which some credit must go to second-unit director Andrew Prose.

War Story 2 is another Home Box Office presentation consisting of three stories set in the Vietnam War. In *Separated*, a lazy and undisciplined private learns what it is to be a real soldier when he is cut off from the rest of his patrol. In *R&R*, a soldier finds it difficult to communicate to his wife the effect his experiences have had on him during a week's leave in Japan. In *The Promise*, an inexperienced nurse has to cope with the horrors of a field hospital and the resentment of her colleagues. The stories maintain the standards of script and direction established by previous entries in the series, and are similarly recommended.

In contrast, Paul D. Robinson's *The Last Platoon* is a cheap Vietnam



THE STICK

exploitation film. Sergeant 'Che' Costa (Richard Hatch) leads a 'Dirty Dozen'-style mission to destroy a crucial bridge on a railway line used by the North Vietnamese to bring supplies into the South. The clichéd script and plot, coupled with low budget and dull direction, make this one to avoid, the appearance of Donald Pleasance as Colonel Abrams notwithstanding. Technical credits appear to be Italian, which may explain some dubbed dialogue.

Rainbow in the Thunder is about a meeting between Davy Crockett and President Andrew Jackson, just prior to the former leaving to gain immortality in Texas. Together they reminisce about their first meeting during the Creek Indian wars, and in particular how the young Crockett (Tim Dunigan) rescued a woman from a man intending to sell her to the Indians. Folk singer Johnny Cash plays the mature Crockett, while British actor David Hemmings both directs the film and plays the older Jackson. The low-budget look of the film is compensated for by some attractive location filming in British Columbia. Readers of Stephen L. Hardin's fascinating article on Crockett in *MF* No.23 will be interested to know that the young Crockett is seen wearing the buckskins and coonskin cap traditionally associated with the character, while the mature Crockett sports the high-collared coat, waistcoat and cravat seen in the portraits.

Video Releases to Buy:

- 'Churchill's War' (DD Distribution)
'Dunkirk — The Fall of France' (DD Distribution)
'History of the Luftwaffe' (DD Distribution)

DD Distribution have released three more documentaries dealing with different aspects of World War II. *Churchill's War* attempts to cover the influence Churchill had on military strategy, but inevitably becomes a rather rushed potpourri of the war, *Dunkirk — The Fall of France*, by being more limited in scope, is more successful, and well explains the course of events that led to the evacuation from the beaches of over a third of a million Allied servicemen. *The History of the Luftwaffe*, narrated by Patrick Allen, charts the rise of the Luftwaffe from its origins in pre-war gliding clubs, its participation in the Spanish Civil War, through to its destruction in 1945. All three documentaries are new productions of about an hour in length, and rely almost exclusively on newsreel footage. **Stephen J. Greenhill**

REVIEWS

'Adventures with the Connaught Rangers, 1809-1814' by William Gratton; ed. Sir Charles Oman; Greenhill Books; xix + 340 pp.; £16.50

Of all the regiments in Wellington's Peninsular army, surely none surpassed the 88th Foot, Connaught Rangers, either for conduct in combat, humour, or the trouble they provided on occasion for the provost-marshal. This magnificent Irish corps was unique and became almost a legend — in the words of the (later) regimental song, they truly were 'the lads to face all dangers'. It is especially pleasing, therefore, to welcome as part of the Greenhill 'Napoleonic Library' series the reprint of William Gratton's *Adventures*, a re-issue of the 1902 edition edited and with an introduction by Sir Charles Oman (the first part of Gratton's reminiscences appeared originally in 1847, the second in 1853).

William Gratton was a member of a distinguished Dublin family (Henry Gratton of 'Gratton's parliament', the 'Irish Demosthenes' according to Fox, was a relative), and was ideally equipped to write about the Rangers: he served with them in some of the most bitter Peninsular actions, and possessed much of the wit and eloquence of his famous kinsman, so that the result is not only one of the most outstanding accounts of service in the Peninsular War, but a remarkable commentary upon a most remarkable regiment, featuring many splendid anecdotes about 'the boys that took the world aisy'. The Rangers seem to have provided much if not most of the inspiration for Charles Lever's famous novel *Charles O'Malley, the Irish Dragoon* (1841), and the stories recounted by Gratton lose nothing in comparison with Lever's.

Contrasting with these lighter moments are memorable descriptions of the sterner face of war, of the carnage of Rodrigo and Badajoz, and innumerable sidelights upon campaign life which provide a most valuable reference.

Sir Charles Oman wisely edited out some of the less interesting parts of Gratton's original work, and comparison with Gratton's initial version of his reminiscences — published anonymously in the *United Service Journal* — reveals some anecdotes which whilst appropriate for its original military readership were perhaps not thought suitable for a wider audience. Even after these slight omissions, Gratton's book remains a truly outstanding example of Peninsular accounts, front one of the toughest and most formidable regiments of the age. It is written in a style typified by Gratton's witty remark on army rations, to the effect that as the Irishman was used to half-starving at home, on service 'his stomach is like a corner cupboard — you might throw anything into it.'

Greenhill Books are to be congratulated

CLASSIFIED

Classified advertisements should be mailed, WITH PAYMENT (see rates below), to MILITARY ILLUSTRATED (CLASSIFIEDS), 169 Seven Sisters Rd., London N4 3NS. Write or type your advertisement in BLOCK LETTERS, making sure you include your name and address; and make clear whether it is a 'want' or 'for sale' notice.

RATES: 35p per word; minimum charge £5.25 (up to 25 words). Semi-display boxed, £7.00 per single column centimetre; minimum charge, £21.00 (up to 3cm deep, single column); double for boxes across two column widths.

All classifieds will be inserted in the next available issue unless requested otherwise. ALL CLASSIFIEDS MUST BE PRE-PAID; we regret we cannot refund payment in the event of later cancellation. Make cheques/POs payable to 'Military Illustrated Ltd.'

FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION collector seeks Légion d'Honneur medal, uniforms, documents. A. Llewellyn, 149 Brocklesmoor, Harlow, Essex.

WANTED any type of military horse tack: saddles, bridles, halters, etc. Also wanted: Boer War slouch hat, cavalry greatcoat, cap or cloak. Ring Bridgwater, Somerset (code 0278) 424390.

Military surplus collector living in Taiwan wishes to hear from dealers in British Army personal equipment. Wang Fong, 3F, 85-1 Wan-Long St., Taipei 11703, Taiwan.

FOR SALE: BREXON Mk. II, 1944, Ingile, with one mag. and de-activation certificate. Gun seen photos p.15 'MI' No.20; minor marks and damage, so will accept £225 + P&P. Serious offers to 'Bren advert', Military Illustrated, 5 Gower St., London W1V 7LJ.

GREAT WAR MEMORIES — 96 page paperback containing the first-hand experiences of World War I veterans. £5.00 inc. P&P from: Mr Clark, 43 Whitfield Road, Sale, Cheshire M33 1NY, England.

Books bought for cash. Military, Naval, Aviation books always wanted. Keegan's Bookshop, Marchant's Place, Friar Street, Reading, Berkshire. Tel: 07341 587-253.

WANTED: World War I and World War II Militaria, anything considered — badges, medals, uniforms, etc. Cash waiting; private collector. Call after 6pm — 0302-321720.

BRITISH SOLDIER WATERCOLOURS. You choose the regiment and period. Examples from the artist — Brian Fraser Harrison, Peddars Cottage, Hessel, Bury St Edmunds IP30 9AX.

THIRD REICH — ADRIAN FORMAN, expert consultant and author of Bender Publications 'FORMAN'S GUIDE TO THIRD REICH GERMAN AWARDS ... AND THEIR VALUES' (£16 + P&P) offers guarantee of originality backed by over 20 years' experience. FREE sample catalogue and book list. Gallery 120, Grays Building, 58 Davies St., Mayfair, London W1V 1AR.

'The Battle of the Lions': Adua, 1896

Text and paintings by RAFFAELE RUGGERI

On 1 March 1896, at Adua in the Tigre region of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), the armies of King Menelik II inflicted on an Italian army under Gen. Baratieri the bloodiest defeat ever suffered during the 19th century by a white colonial force at the hands of native enemies. Italian losses totalled some 6,600 dead, 500 wounded (a horribly eloquent ratio), and some 1,900 captured; the Italian government fell, and the whole process of Italian colonial expansion was brought to a halt. In Ethiopia the victory was lauded as 'the battle of lions against lions', and was included thereafter in the Ethiopian calendar as a historic date.

During the spring of 1895 Italy, after ten years of expensive, often weak, and on occasion disastrous colonial rule in Eritrea, attempted to expand her colony into Abyssinian territory. At the end of April the region of Tigre, to the south of the Italian possessions, was occupied and fortified posts were constructed. In September 1895 the Abyssinian Negus ('King of Kings') Menelik II issued the *ketit* or general call to arms among his people. During that autumn the Abyssinian army moved up from Addis Ababa to reconquer Tigre; and on 7 December the Italo-Eritrean defences on the Amba Alagi were destroyed. A month later the last major Italian position in the occupied territory, Fort Makalle, surrendered after a 14-day siege.

On 21 February 1896 Menelik occupied Adua, where he held a two-day council of war. It was decided that the Abyssinians would remain basically on the defensive, probing toward the Hamasen region if no Italian initiative developed.

On the evening of 28 February another council of war was held in the Italo-Eritrean camp at nearby Sauria — a council influenced by inadequate intelligence as to the state of the Negus's army, and by some uncertainty over Italian food supplies (a 400-camel caravan was expected

on 2 March). Three possible options were considered. An offensive into the heart of Abyssinia was ruled out as impossible. An entirely passive defence was judged impractical, given the length of the front to be covered against a mobile enemy. It was decided to carry out a cautious campaign of manoeuvre, with autonomous forces of variable strength.

Gen. Baratieri suggested a temporary retreat, but was overruled not only by his government but also by the apparently unanimous advice of his four brigade commanders — Gens. Arimondi, Dabormida, Albertone and Ellena — and his chief-of-staff Gen. Valenzano. Underestimating the enemy's strength and preparedness they urged an advance, which nevertheless fell short of a determined offensive. Baratieri's indecisiveness and the opinionated stance of his brigade commanders were to have disastrous results — which were not unforeseen by at least some officers present.

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

On 29 February Baratieri issued his operational orders, and divided his troops into four columns of march:

Right Column: 2nd Inf Bde. (Gen. Dabormida)
3rd Inf. Regt. (Col. Ragui)



Abyssinian warrior chief in all his barbaric splendour. The headdress and the trimming of the lembd are of lion's mane — the warrior had to kill the lion himself. The lembd was worn in battle, despite its unmanly appearance; it was a prized sign of warrior caste status. Though they practised a form of Christianity, and went into battle at Adua singing hymns to St. George, the Abyssinians were renowned for their ferocity. (All photos, author's collection)

5th Inf. Bn. (Maj. Giardano) — 430 rifles

6th Inf. Bn. (Maj. Prato) — 430

10th Inf. Bn. (Maj. De Fonseca) — 450

6th Inf. Regt. (Col. Airaghi)

3rd Inf. Bn. (Maj. Branchi) — 430

13th Inf. Bn. (Maj. Rayneri) — 450

14th Inf. Bn. (Maj. Solaro) — 450

Native Mobile Militia Bn. (Maj. De Vito) — 950

Ketit Co., Asmara (Capt. Sermasi) — 210

2nd Artillery Bde. (Maj. Zola)

5th Mountain Bty. (Capt. Mottino) — 6 guns

6th Mtn. Bty. (Capt. Regazzi) — 6 guns

7th Mtn. Bty. (Capt. Gisla) — 6 guns

Centre Column: 1st Inf. Bde. (Gen. Arimondi)

1st Bersaglieri Regt. (Col. Stevani)

1st Bers. Bn. (Maj. De Ste-

fano) — 423

2nd Bers. Bn. (Lt. Col. Compiano) — 350

2nd Inf. Regt. (Col. Brusati)

2nd Inf. Bn. (Maj. Viancini) — 450

4th Inf. Bn. (Maj. De Amicis) — 500

9th Inf. Bn. (Maj. Baudoin) — 550

1st Co., 5th Native Bn. (Capt. Pavese) — 220

8th Mtn. Bty. (Capt. Loffredo) — 6 guns

11th Mtn. Bty. (Capt. Franzini) — 6 guns

A warrior of one of the native irregular 'bands' hired by the Italians in their East African campaigns. About 375 of the Akele-Guzai band served with the vanguard of the Native Bde. at Adua. Apart from the Vetterli M1870/87 Special Corps model rifle he is entirely in native dress; the lembd is arranged to leave the right arm free.

Right centre:

A Bersaglieri sergeant photographed on his departure for Africa in 1888; the only difference in 1896 would be the absence of the Carabinieri Reali sidearm, worn on the left hip here but later withdrawn.

Left Column: Native Bde. (Gen. Albertone)

1st Native Bn. (Maj. Turitto) — 950
6th Native Bn. (Maj. Cossu) — 850
7th Native Bn. (Maj. Valli) — 950
8th Native Bn. (Maj. Gamera) — 950
Akele-Guzai Band (Lt. Spelli) — 376

1st Arty. Bde. (Maj. De Rosa)
1st Native Bty. (Capt. Henry) — 4 guns
2nd Sect., 2nd Native Bty. (Lt. Vibi) — 2 guns
3rd Mtn. Bty. (Capt. Bianchini) — 4 guns
4th Mtn. Bty. (Capt. Masotto) — 4 guns

Reserve Column: 3rd Inf. Bde. (Gen. Ellena)

4th Inf. Regt. (Col. Romero)
7th Inf. Bn. (Maj. Montecchi) — 450
8th Inf. Bn. (Lt. Col. Violante) — 450
11th Inf. Bn. (Maj. Manfredi) — 480
5th Inf. Regt. (Col. Nava)
Alpini Bn. (Lt. Col. Menini) — 550
15th Inf. Bn. (Maj. Ferraro) — 500
16th Inf. Bn. (Maj. Vandiol) — 500
3rd Native Bn. (Lt. Col. Galiano) — 1,150
1st Quick-Firing Bty. (Capt. Aragno) — 6 guns
2nd Quick-Firing Bty. (Capt. Mangia) — 6 guns
1/2 Engineer Co. — 70 rifles

Total strength was thus 551 officers, 7,823 infantry, 1,520 artillery, and 6,790 ascaris (including warriors of the auxiliary 'band', and 400 artillery ascaris).



The estimates of Menelik's strength at Adua vary widely. According to calculations made by Gen. Albertone and other Italian officers in captivity after the battle it was as follows:

Negus Menelik (Shoa) — 34,000-38,000 men
Iteghie Taitu (Semien) — 5,000-6,000
Ras Makonnen (Harrar) — 15,000-16,000
Ras Mikael (Wollo-Galla) — 14,000-15,000
Uagscium Guangul (Lasta) — 10,000-11,000
Fitaurari Gabcehu (Giraghe) — 13,000-14,000
Fitaurari Mangascia (Atikim) — 5,000-6,000
King Takla Haimanot (Gogiam) — 5,000-6,000
Ras Olie (leggiu) — 6,000-7,000
Ras Mangascia (Tigre) and Ras Alula (Hamasen) — 3,000-4,000


This gives a total of between 110,000 and 123,000 warriors. Other sources disputed this estimate. Maj. Salsa, who had visited the Abyssinian camp in February, calculated 80,000 warriors, but after the battle revised this to 130,000. The Italian spy Cappucci put the figure at between 65,000 and 75,000; the historian Count Rossini, 70,000 to 80,000; the ex-officer Felter at 110,000-120,000; the Grasmac Josef, 110,000; the Russian Earl Leont'ev, 85,000 foot and 22,600 horsemen; Capt. Clochette, as many as 150,000; and Count Gleichen, no less than 200,000, three-quarters of them armed with rifles.

The true figure can never be known, but the total number of warriors theoretically available to the Negus clearly outnumbered the total Italian force by between 4:1 and 8:1, and it is clear that

quite a high proportion of the warriors were armed with rifles — see caption to colour plate.

THE BATTLE

In the last days of February each army received good news. The Abyssinians learned that Ras Uolde Giorghis from Kaffa and Degiacc Tesamma had defeated Mohammed Anfari, Sultan of Aussa. Four days later the Italo-Eritrean camp heard of the landing of new reinforcements, and of Col. Stevani's victory over a rebel force. All sources confirm that the morale of both Italian troops and ascaris was excellent.



The isolation of the Left Column

The movement of the Italian force began at 9.30 p.m. on the evening of 29 February, and readers should refer to the accompanying map of this arid and confusing terrain. The objective was a position between Rebbi Arienni hill and Erara hill, the latter being wrongly identified at the time as Kidane Meret — a feature which in fact lay a good distance to the

south-west. During the night march the Left Column got ahead of the Central and Reserve Columns, and reached Erara hill before the other elements had reached Rebbi Arienni. Its lead elements then pushed on west-south-west across the Mai Agam valley to occupy the village of Adi Beci. Only at dawn on 1 March did Gen. Albertone manage to orient himself by means of the Semaiata massif; it lay on his

The area of the campaign, and the battlefield of Adua. Large open arrows indicate main Abyssinian axes of advance; black triangles, Italian unit positions (in some cases these indicate only elements of units; and times are necessarily approximate); small black arrows, main axes of Italian retreat. Left, Reserve, Centre and Right columns are indicated below 'LC, Res.C, CC, RC';

- (0) Akele-Guzai band vanguard, Nat. Bde., LC; 5.30 a.m.
- (1) 1st Nat. Bn., Nat. Bde., LC; 6.10 a.m.
- (2) Cesarini Co., 1st Nat. Bn., Nat. Bde., LC; 7.00 a.m.
- (3) 1st Arty. Bde., Nat. Bde., LC; 6.30-11.20 a.m.
- (4) 7th Nat. Bn., Nat. Bde., LC; 6.30-10.20 a.m.
- (5) 8th Nat. Bn., Nat. Bde., LC; 6.30-10.20 a.m.
- (6) 6th Nat. Bn., Nat. Bde., LC; 6.30-10.20 a.m.
- (7) 1st Nat. Bn., Nat. Bde., LC; second posn., 7.15 a.m.
- (8) 3rd Nat. Bn., 3rd Inf. Bde., Res.C; 10.00-12.00 a.m.

- (9) 1st & 2nd QF Btys., 3rd Inf. Bde., Res.C; 10.00-12.00 a.m.
- (10) 16th Inf. Bn., 3rd Inf. Bde., Res.C; 10.00-12.00 a.m.
- (11) 2nd Inf. Regt., 1st Inf. Bde., CC; 10.00-12.00 a.m.
- (12) 8th Mtn. Bty., 1st Inf. Bde., CC; 10.00-12.00 a.m.
- (13) 11Q, 1st & 3rd Inf. Bdes., CC & Res.C; and 5th Regt., 3rd Inf. Bde., CC; 10.00-12.00 a.m.
- (14) 11th Mtn. Bty., 1st Inf. Bde., CC; 10.00-12.00 a.m.
- (15) Bersaglieri Regt., 1st Inf. Bde., CC; 10.00 a.m.-2.00 p.m.
- (16) 15th Inf. Bn., 3rd Inf. Bde., Res.C; 10.00-12.00 a.m.
- (17) Alpini Bn., 3rd Inf. Bde., Res.C; 10.00 a.m.-2.00 p.m.
- (18) 4th Inf. Bn., 1st Inf. Bde., CC; 10.00 a.m.-4.00 p.m.
- (19) 4th Inf. Regt., 3rd Inf. Bde., Res.C; 6.30-12.00 a.m.
- (20) HQ, 1st & 3rd Inf. Bdes., CC & Res.C; first posn. 6.30-8.45 a.m.
- (21) Nat. Mobile Militia Bn., 2nd Inf. Bde., RC; 11.00 a.m.-4.00 p.m.
- (22) Ketit Co., 2nd Inf. Bde., RC; 11.00 a.m.-4.00 p.m.
- (23) 2nd Arty. Bde., 2nd Inf. Bde., RC; 11.00 a.m.-4.00 p.m.
- (24) 3rd Inf. Bn., 2nd Inf. Bde., RC; 11.00 a.m.-4.00 p.m.
- (25) 13th Inf. Bn., 2nd Inf. Bde., RC; 11.00 a.m.-4.00 p.m.
- (26) 14th Inf. Bn., 2nd Inf. Bde., RC; 11.00 a.m.-4.00 p.m.
- (27) 3rd Inf. Regt., 2nd Inf. Bde., RC; 11.00 a.m.-4.00 p.m.
- (28) Abyssinian arty. btys.

Left:

The rugged terrain of Adua: Mt. Raio seen from the slopes of Scium Cole, looking roughly south-east. There was heavy fighting around this feature in the later stages of the battle.





Above:

The infantry officer Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Galliano, defender of Makalle, who died leading the 3rd Native Bn. at Adua. Note the M1894 dark blue patrol jacket worn with the white service dress cap and trousers, as on our colour plate.

Above right:

A similar alternative field uniform for Italian officers: a Bersagliere major wearing a dark khaki tropical tunic, basically of the same cut as the other ranks' version, with the white cap and trousers; note light blue cuff ranking.

Above centre:

Artillery officers photographed in 1896, wearing (left) khaki and (right) blue patrol uniforms. All four — Castelli, Saya, Masotto and Bianchini — died at Adua, the last two commanding the 3rd and 4th 'Sirilian' Mtn. Btys. with Albertone's Native Bde. on Mt. Sendedo.



left, showing that his vanguard was far too advanced — by now on the true Kidane Meret — and that his force was completely separated from the intended line Esciasho-Rebbi Arienni-Rajo.

The Abyssinians kept clo-

Below:

Though blurred, and distorted in the centre, this panoramic photo is useful for an appreciation of the conditions in which the battle was fought. By comparison with our map, it can be seen that this general view was taken looking roughly south-west from the slopes of Mt. Esciasho, the position of the first Italo-Eritrean HQ, 6.30-8.45 a.m. — see item 20 on map. The Right Column should have deployed forward straight down the centre of the photo; instead they moved far to the right of 'Mt. Dirian' into the end of the 'Mariam Scioaitu' valley (sic).

sely in touch with the Italo-Eritrean force by means of scouts, and Menelik was fully advised by 4 a.m. Ras Makonnen, his commander-in-chief, was on the summit of Abba Garima; and on observing the division of the enemy columns he determined to infiltrate between and attack the dispersed units. The fighting began at about 6 a.m. and immediately became extremely violent. Within two hours the Italian vanguard, attacked by great numbers of the enemy, was partly overrun, the survivors falling back on Kidane Meret and from there to Monoxeito, where they were annihilated.

Meanwhile, Albertone deployed the bulk of his brigade: 1st Native Bn. on Kidane

Meret, 7th Nat. Bn. on Sendedo with his artillery, 6th Nat. Bn. on Adi Beci, and 8th Nat. Bn. in rear reserve. He hoped for reinforcements from the Right Column; but throughout the battle of Adua communications were very poor. All the brigade commanders had 'forgotten' to bring up their heliographs (probably so as to avoid having to pay too much attention to orders from HQ), and far more messages were lost than ever reached their goal. At 6.50 a.m. Gen. Albertone asked Gen. Baratieri for support from Dabormida's Right Column, but the appeal only reached him at 9 a.m.

By about 7.15 a.m. the 1st Nat. Bn. had retired from Kidane Meret to the north of Sendedo, having lost some





Left:

(1) Abyssinian Fitaurari. Literally 'man who leads the vanguard', this title could be used specifically for a 'general' or in an honorary sense for a leading warrior chief. Over his simple white cotton kamish tunic and wide trousers he wears the sign of his status as a leading member of the highest warrior caste: the *lembe*, a 'cape' of lionskin, leather and velvet, richly embossed and embroidered. Round the neck he wears a cross of Tigre style — Abyssinia is historically a Christian nation, though following its own idiosyncratic rite. His shield is leather, richly decorated with *mirahvork*. Apart from the shofel sabre and a thrusting spear with a socketed crossguard head, he carries a Remington 'rolling block' carbine — the most common modern firearm among the Abyssinians.

The number of modern rifles available in 1896 is disputed. Some contemporary Italian estimates are very high, one even claiming as many as 120,000. While a natural tendency to excuse the disaster by exaggerating the enemy's strength certainly plays a part in such claims, the Abyssinians were relatively well supplied with rifles. Many came in via Egypt and the Sudan, and many more direct from French merchants. After the battle of Dogali (January 1887) peace terms included Italian agreement for the Swiss merchant Vogt to deliver 1,000 Remingtons formerly used by the Papal army; and in late 1887 the Italians delivered 5,000 Remingtons and Martini-Heurys to Menelik. Later treaties included agreement for direct and regular supplies of rifles by the Italians. In 1896 types in use included mainly Remington and Le Gras, but also Mauser, Berdan, Vitrinelli/Vitali, Martini-Heury, Penbody, Chassepot, Windwiser and Kropatschek. As early as 1887 Capt. Cecchi, an experienced local intelligence source, estimated that 145,000 warriors had about 41,000 muzzle-loaders and 30,000 more modern types, the other 74,000 men relying on edged weapons. The most cautious estimate would therefore give the warriors at Adua around 35,000-40,000 modern rifles. They also had six Hotchkiss fieldpieces, and a few Maxims.

(2) Galla cavalryman. The tribal origin is indicated by the hairstyle, the simple arrangement of the white sciamma robe, and the silver bracelet. Typical weapons were two or three javelins (metal rings on the shaft indicating the number of enemies killed), the shofel and a large Galla knife.

(a) The shofel sabre, double-edged and sharply curved, with a brass-decorated leather scabbard.

(b) A superior shofel with a richly silver-mounted scabbard.

(c) 'Slon' trumpet of horn, bamboo and leather.

Captions to colour paintings overleaf:

Right:

(1) Sergeant, 2nd Bn., 1st Bersaglieri Regt., Centre Column. The Bersaglieri wore their characteristic panache of black/green cockerel feathers on the right side of the 1885 tropical helmet; and their corps badge on the cockade on the front, as at (1a). The linen tropical uniform of 'light bronze' (khaki) dated from 1887 but was officially ordered only in the 29 February 1889 regulations. The jacket had five front buttons, shoulder straps, a stand collar bearing the star of Savoy (for all ranks and units) in white cloth for enlisted ranks; and two vertical doubling strips down the front, giving a 'Norfolk jacket' appearance. The officer's uniform had lateral pockets in the chest behind these strips, but otherwise differed only in finer material, in insignia, and in interior detail of the trousers. NCOs had red forearm ranking; officers, light blue. The weapon is the M1870/87 Vetterli 10.4mm infantry rifle, a bolt-action rifle with a four-round magazine. Two cartridge pouches (at Adua each man carried 112 rounds) are supported by the belt and by a brace passing round the back of the neck. The single-quillon knife bayonet was frogged on the left hip. The M1891 Mammlicher-Carcano 6.5mm rifle, a far superior weapon, was in fact available in 1896, but was withdrawn from troops sailing for Africa in order to avoid the logistic burden of two types of ammunition.

(2) Private of an infantry battalion.

Photos show the frequent use of a helmet cover. Spare underclothes and small equipment items were carried in the off-white or ticking haversack, or rolled inside the Bersaglieri's dark blue cape, which was issued to infantry generally. Rations were issued for two days at Adua; they were carried in the haversack and/or in the white metal mess tin attached to the rear of the belt. The canteen was of archaic 'keg' shape, of willow or poplar with iron strapping.

Troops for East Africa were officially volunteers from among men fulfilling their military service, though in 1895-96 increasing numbers were in fact compelled to serve there. Individuals were organised into new battalions, numbered in sequence, and thence into regiments and brigades which were purely tactical and had no long-term identity; more importantly, they had no experience of serving together. Retitling is confusing, but it appears that only the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Inf. Bns. had long service in Africa, all higher-numbered battalions being raised since December 1895 and sent almost directly to the front. Previous campaigns had been fought very largely by locally raised native battalions.

(3) Captain, 1st Native Mountain Artillery Battery, Left Column. This officer wears

a common combination of items: the white-covered cap of everyday service dress, with three gold rank braids and the Artillery badge; the white trousers of that uniform; and the jacket of the new M1894 'marching' or patrol uniform in dark blue. The jacket had five gilt buttons and black silk ribbon 'loops'; silver metal collar stars; and shoulder strap ranking — silver stars for company and gold stars for field officers, and gold stars above the silver generals' device for general officers. Over the jacket, which was designed specifically for African service, he wears the light blue officer's sash, the shoulder belt of the Artillery officer, and a narrow strap supporting a holstered M1874 revolver. Slings pass from the scabbard of the M1887 officer's sabre under the jacket.

(3a) Helmet panache for an Artillery officer — 16.5cm, black ostrich feathers, in a gilt metal mount; troops wore the same from a yellow wadded poupon.

(3b) M1874 revolver.

(3c) M1887 officer's sabre; in Africa the black swordknot was always used. The Bersaglieri used their own sabre in M1887 scabbards with brass rather than steel fittings.

(4) Borazan (bugler), 1st Native Bn., Left Column. The red tarboosh or fez, white linen jacket and knee-length senafilo trousers were common to all units among these first regular native troops raised in Eritrea. The fez (tassel and the etaga (a woollen sash, 2.3m long by 40cm wide) were in unit colours, and the battalions were known by their commanders' names: 1st Turito Bn., red; 2nd Hidalgo Bn., light blue; 3rd Galliano Bn., crimson; 4th Toselli Bn., black; 5th Ameglio Bn., 'tattai'; 6th Cosmi Bn., green, later red/black; 7th Valli Bn., white, later red/light blue; 8th Camerra Bn., tawny. The Artillery wore a yellow sash, the Gunner Co. a yellow tassel and the Train Co. red/yellow.

Rank was indicated by silver metal stars on the fez and red chevrons on both upper arms; three of each for Sciumbasci, two for Bulukbasci, one for Muntaz. Sharpshooters wore a silver metal rifle device on the fez, gunners an artillery badge; note here the bugler's red cloth device on the right sleeve only of the jacket, which had shoulder straps and five front buttons, but no pockets. This asari has a white cloth wrapped round his fez for extra protection from the sun; field equipment consisted of a single M1877 cartridge pouch, the old Vetterli M1870 rifle and sword bayonet, in this case the M1884 bugle — as at (4a) — a haversack and a small leather waterskin, and a blanket and Bersaglieri cape rolled.

(5) Sleeve rank insignia: (a) lance-corporal; (b) furieri or quartermaster; (c) major-general; (d) lieutenant.

30% of its men. At that time 14 mountain artillery pieces of the 1st Arty. Bde. on Sendedo opened fire with airburst shrapnel rounds; great gaps were torn in the advancing masses of Abyssinians, who checked for a time, but not for long. Pushed on by pressure from behind they resumed their attacks on the Native Bde. on and around Sendedo in two great columns: some 15,000 made for the Italian centre and right, and 2,000-3,000 swung round to the Italian left. These troops were drawn from the followings of Ras Makonnen, Mikael, and Olie, and were led in person by prestigious chiefs such as Fitaurari Gabejehu, the victor of Alam Agagi, and the Fitarraris Tacle and Tafari.

Impressive as these warriors were, they were checked once again by the furious fire of the 14 fast-served mountain guns and the rifles of the ascaris. Indeed, they were forced to retire for some hundreds of







Photographs of Italian troops actually taken in the field in 1896 are rare. Most of the correspondents with the expeditionary force foresaw the result of the ill-planned Italian advance only too well, and remained in safety at Massaua. The only photographer to accompany the troops was Pippo Ledri, whose equipment was lost at Adua. The blurred group photograph of an Italian Cacciatori patrol does at least show the general outline of the uniforms, and the tall green panaches worn in the helmets by these light infantry units. The single study was in fact taken in Libya in 1913, by which time this infantry corporal had received the M1891 Mauser-Carcano rifle.

continued from page 11

yards on the Italian centre and right; but on the left the 7th Nat. Bn. came under intensive pressure from troops supported by Abyssinian artillery — a battery of six Hotchkiss guns on Lazat hill.

By about 8.30 a.m. the battle had reached a critical stage for the Abyssinians, who had suffered severe losses. In an effort to keep up the momentum Fitaurari Gagejehu, a gigantic figure in his red *lembd*, threw down rifle and shield and attacked waving only a stick, only to fall shot on the slope of Kidane Meret. Gen. Albertone, convinced of his success, shouted his thanks to Maj. De Rosa of the Artillery Brigade; and on the



summit of Abba Garima the Negus was ready to order a general retreat. He was more or less shamed into making a renewed effort, however, by the taunts of the veteran Ras Mangascia and the Empress Taitu; and committed the 25,000 men of his imperial guard. After a brief check this massive reinforcement proved decisive. The huge waves of warriors overwhelmed the Native Bde. elements on Kidane Meret, Monoxeito, Sendedo, and in the valleys between the hills. The Mai Agam valley was soon filled as far as the slopes of Raio with a mass of Abyssinian foot and mounted troops, urging forward with cries of 'Tamarrek! Tamarrek!' ('Surrender!') after the fleeing ascaris.

Gen. Albertone was captured. The last elements of his force to go under were the 'Sicilian' batteries on Sendedo, who died in their places to the last man. Maj. Gamerra, defending himself with his revolver, was wounded in the face and captured by one of Makonnen's chiefs. Lt. Pantano, carrying Lt. Albino in his arms, was captured: Albino blew out his own brains. By about 10.45 a.m. the Native Bde. had ceased to exist.

The Centre and Reserve Columns

Meanwhile the Centre Column, holding Rebbi Arienni and Esciasho, moved forward and took up positions on Raio, Zeban Daro and Bellah. At the same time the Reserve Column was largely

deployed forward across the 'Sycamore valley', its units becoming mixed with those of the Centre Column along the line of hill features southwest of the valley. As the huge weight of the Abyssinian attack fell on the line and washed between its anchor points a good deal of dislocation of individual units also took place, with companies scattered in desperate defence of whichever hill feature they could reach. After about 11 a.m. the battle broke down into a more or less disconnected series of violent local actions. The enemy mass pursuing the remnants of the Native Bde. surrounded many Italian positions, and other Shoa warriors attacked the rear elements of the Reserve Column around Rebbi Arienni and Amba Bairot.

Forty Bersaglieri of the 1st Co., 2nd Bn. climbed the steep rocks of Zeban Daro, to die there in hand-to-hand fighting. On the left, around Raio and Erara, the 2nd and 9th Bns. from 2nd Inf. Regt., the 3rd Native Bn., and the 16th Bn. and 3rd Co., Alpini Bn. from 5th Inf. Regt. resisted until annihilated. Gen. Arimondi, commanding the Centre column, fell in that area; some say he was shot down near his HQ, others that he killed himself. There are many conflicting versions of the death of Lt. Col. Galliano of the 3rd Native Bn., but the consensus is that he was captured and subsequently killed.

A survivor, Sgt. Tedone, testified that the rank and file

fought in the kneeling position, while the senior NCOs and officers always remained standing, their red and light blue rank insignia and sashes making them easy targets. He called this 'an impardonable waste of lives', and tactically mistaken in that many units lost their commanders early in the action.

The spirited resistance of two companies of the Alpini Bn. in the saddle between Raio and Ibsa; of part of 4th Inf. Regt. on Amba Bairot; and of the 15th Inf. Bn., an Alpini Co. and two other companies on positions near Mt. Bellah, allowed the remnants of the Centre and Reserve Columns to retreat — with Gen. Baratieri — over the Gundapta plateau and the Jeha valley. All resistance on Mt. Raio ended at about noon. Gen. Baratieri was to write that the officers had lost all control of their troops.

It is believed that more Italo-Eritrean troops fell while retreating through the Jeha valley than in the pitched battles — of some 2,000, only 800 survived. Many, exhausted and desperate, left the column to find water and perished in the attempt. Harried mercilessly by Galla cavalry, some officers and men (according to Sgt. Tedone's account) killed themselves rather than be captured by an enemy with a reputation for dreadful cruelty; others, exhausted, were massacred almost without resistance. Many threw away weapons and equipment to lighten their load

(and in the belief that they would be spared if captured unarmed). The survivors, in two groups, finally crossed the Belesa river and, in the dawn of 3 March, reached Adi Caieh and Adi Ugri. Gen. Baratieri lost no time in telegraphing his version of the defeat.

The Right Column

Meanwhile, what of the Right Column drawn largely from Gen. Dabormida's 2nd Infantry Brigade?

At dawn Dabormida had been ordered to move from Rebbi Arienni down the Mai Agam valley to the support of Albertone's Native Brigade. Instead the Column entered the Mariam Shoaitu valley, at the end of which was a large enemy encampment. This mistake is unexplained to this day; but is hardly inexplicable, given that the maps used that day were inaccurate in the naming of certain key hill features, and that the topography was naturally confusing. Instead of establishing contact with the Left Column, they became completely isolated in a deep valley.

The Abyssinians seem to have fought a holding action here, tying the Italians down in the valley by hit-and-run attacks and harassment without getting deeply involved, while the other Columns were destroyed. The 2nd Bde. deployed in the valley and on Mt. Diriam; they resisted all enemy attacks, and in the early afternoon were even able to go onto the offensive, occupying the heights of Azgheba and Mehebar Cedal. It was only in the late afternoon, when the frequent attacks from the Mariam Shoaitu valley began to be accompanied by others from the rear where the general Abyssinian advance allowed the enemy to swing round behind Diriam, that Gen. Dabormida decided to fall back, supported by fire from Italian elements on Mt. Erar.

The brigade's resistance in its original positions was, however, maintained until sunset. Between 1 p.m. and 3 p.m. Abyssinian forces in this

sector were reinforced by the arrival of warriors from the followings of Ras Olie, Mikael, Mangascia, Alula, Uagsciuni Guangul, Degiacc Ouldie and Balcia, and of other troops from Axum who had not yet been blooded. In all, some 40,000 or 50,000 warriors attacked the positions of the Right Column. At about 4 p.m. Gen. Dabormida became concerned for the first time about the outcome of the action; and about half an hour later he ordered the retreat, through the valley under Mt. Erar (which had been kept clear since morning by the 4th Bn., 2nd Inf. Regt. of the Centre Column, and his own 13th Bn., 6th Inf. Regiment).

The retreat was hardly under way before the hitherto reliable discipline of Dabormida's units began to break down. Although the gunners did manage to put some of their pieces in battery to hold back the pursuit, the untidy withdrawal quickly became a flight, and in places a massacre. Pressed hard on the flanks and rear, the 2nd Bde. stood and fought on many occasions, but losses were heavy. The last remnants of the brigade withdrew after

dark, part through the Jeha valley and part via Sauria and Mai Maret.

During one of the confused night actions Gen. Dabormida was killed. His column, picking up other groups of stragglers on the march, was repeatedly attacked, including actions at Entiscio, Mai Gaheta, Debra Dämo and Guna Guna. Attacks were mounted not only by large bands under Ras Sebat and Degiacc Agos Tafari, but also by the peasants of the countryside, who revenged themselves for all the requisitions, forced labour and punitive expeditions which they had suffered. Part of the Right Column reached Adi Caieh on 3 March, part on the following day, leaving a 100km-long trail of their dead and wounded in their wake.

Aftermath and reckoning

Total Italo-Eritrean losses were reckoned at 289 officers, 4,300 Italian soldiers and 2,000 ascaris dead; about 500 wounded; and about 1,900 taken prisoner. About 800 captured ascaris from Tigre (as opposed to those from Eritrea, the Sudan and Somalia) paid for their 'treason' by having their right hands and

left feet hacked off. The survivors amounted to 258 officers, 4,666 soldiers and some 4,000 ascaris. Total losses thus amounted to about 53% of the Italo-Eritrean force. Abyssinian losses are estimated at about 7,000 dead and 10,000 wounded.

The Abyssinians began to withdraw from the captured territory on 20 March; Menelik preferred to have weakened neighbours than to provoke further attention from the great colonial powers. Meanwhile Gen. Baldissera, who took overall command on 4 March, reinforced the Massaua-Asinara line, and sent Maj. Salsa to open peace negotiations with the Negus. On 4 May Adigrat was occupied for the third time, only to be evacuated and destroyed two weeks later. Prisoners held in Tigre were handed back at about the same period, and two Engineer Cos. were allowed to march to the battlefield to bury the corpses.

On 18 June hostilities ceased; and that October the treaty of Addis Ababa recognised Abyssinia's independence. Their victory in this 'battle of lions against lions' passed into the Abyssinian calendar as an important historical turning-point; it certainly gave the empire the freedom to expand southwards for many years. In Italy the Crispi government fell; and further colonial expansion was abandoned for some 15 years. **ML**

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Sciumbasci or sergeant of Eritrean infantry ascaris, the troops who made up much of the ill-fated Left Column. Note three silver stars on fez, and three red chevrons on sleeves, both indicating rank. The white cloak, with its broad red stripe, arranged around his hips is not a uniform item but a local garment worn as a native distinction.

British Field Works 1914-18 (2): Dugouts, Posts, Concealment

DAVID D. VICKRIDGE
Painting by PAUL HANNON

In the first part of this article (*MI* No.22, p.18) the 'lateral' aspects of the trench system — trenches, and wire — were described and illustrated. Equally important was the underground network of dugouts and the supporting system of posts, each with its designated place both in the defensive plan and in the routines of trench life.

As the war progressed the bunker and the 'pillbox' became more important features of the trenchscape; defence in depth, using smaller numbers of men in a series of strongpoints, proved less vulnerable to the barrage than lining the fire trenches with whole companies. In any case the network of posts was the skeleton of any defence — posts for command, for casualty clearance, for the machine guns, trench mortars, and signalling.

The first forms of 'overhead cover' were crude in the extreme: simple, cramped 'funk holes' burrowed under the front lip of the trench and providing rather inadequate cover for one or two men. Officially these rabbit holes met with a mixed reception; they made subsidence of the trench sides more likely, and often left legs and arms projecting over the walkways to create an obstacle course for carrying parties. Much preferred were the forms of cover described in the *Manual of Field Engineering*, in which square-cut recesses between 2ft. and 4ft. 6in. wide were roofed over with boards, corrugated iron or brushwood

and then covered with 9in.-12in. of earth. Such protection was deemed adequate against splinters, shrapnel balls and grenades. Four main points were to be observed in the construction of shelters: (a) the parapet must not be unduly weakened by them; (b) they must not curtail the number of rifles available; (c) it must be possible to get out of them quickly; and (d) simple and numerous shelters are better than a few elaborate ones⁽¹⁾.

Alternatively the fire trench itself could be given overhead cover, but unless the roof was propped and loops provided the defensive function was seriously undermined. Though in vogue in several sectors in all armies in 1915, this system of overhead protection was never common.

Specialised machine gun

posts had also been devised before the war; these could take several forms but usually had in common a shallow platform on which the machine gun tripod was placed. Behind the platform was often deeper cover giving protection to the crew, or even a trench leading to a nearby splinterproof shelter. Where the MG position was located in a trench the outline of the pit was often the arc of a circle which gave a wide field of fire. In all cases they were best placed where they could bring powerful enfilade or oblique fire, creating beaten zones through which attacking troops would have to pass⁽²⁾.

It was soon realised that it was usually best to keep the Vickers out of the front line fire trench, and by 1915 they were normally kept back in or near the second line, where one gun was given several firing points. The best posts were also equipped with two or more small bunkers for belt-filling and crew quarters. During bombardments the gun could be dismounted and taken below. After 1915 flexible forward defence from *ad hoc* posts and shell holes was usually the tactical rôle of the Lewis gun. The Lewis was less capable of sustained fire

or long range accuracy, but it was much lighter and relatively easy to move⁽³⁾. Concealment of the MG post was almost as important as protection, and enfilading positions were especially useful in this respect because they were difficult to observe from the front. In well prepared positions the loophole was sometimes concealed by means of a wooden box, the hinged outer face of which was covered with a dummy sandbag⁽⁴⁾.

According to *Notes on the Tactical Employment of Machine Guns and Lewis Guns* the MG loop needed to be not less than 9in. in height and should avoid straight edges wherever possible. Where appropriate grass, straw or gauze blending into the surroundings could be used. Sometimes, particularly during advances or retreats, it was necessary to deploy MGs in open pits; in this case the minimum dimension for satisfactory operation of the gun was an emplacement 4ft. square⁽⁵⁾.

Specialised posts were similarly constructed for trench mortars (usually in pairs) rifle grenade batteries and signal rocket stations; but in all these cases the fire was indirect, so no loop was

Men of the Border Regiment resting in a front line trench, Thiepval Wood, August 1916. They sit in typical 'funk holes', big enough for one man and burrowed into the wall of the trench. Above the right hand man is laid a set of 1914 Pattern leather equipment; the elliptical object on the left hand end of the belt is the head of the 1908 Pattern entrenching 'implement'. The staff sergeant on the left wears the 'Gor blimey' soft peaked cap with ear flaps, and behind him, calculated to blend into the trench scenery, is a steel helmet covered in sandbag material. (Imperial War Museum Q872)




required in the post itself. From the front such positions were either made to be as nearly invisible as possible, or identical to nearby sections of trench.

Sniping and observation points were as many and various as ingenuity allowed, and made use of a number of ruses. Popular among these were concealed loopholes, as for example where a hole was cut through the parapet and obscured by trench debris, with the rifle muzzle covered by an old tin can or shoe. In another version a single brick would be removed from a wall and concealed with painted gauze. Usually a dark cloth shrouded the back of a loop to avoid throwing the user into silhouette. Like listening posts or forward shell hole defences, sniping posts were often reached by a sap or tunnel out to the front of the main line. As Herbert McBride, a sniper with the 21st Bn. Canadian Expeditionary Force, recalled, these posts were usually set at an angle to the front to avoid detection. The clever sniper used several locations to keep the enemy guessing as to his whereabouts⁽⁶⁾.

DEPTH, AND NEW DESIGN

As the war progressed heavier guns were used in ever greater bombardments against the trench systems, and sandbagged tin and timber structures were not equal to the task. Over half of all casualties came from the enemy artillery. One of many similar incidents was witnessed by Lt. Edwin Campton Vaughn of the 8th Bn., Royal Warwickshire Regiment near Herbecourt in early 1917, when an NCO's dugout off an unfinished shaft received a direct hit:

'The last of the shells had obviously burst inside the shaft, for the entrance was completely blocked, and the top of the shelter was lying across the trench. In the faint light that still remained we saw the sandbags and pieces of timber half buried in the mud. Holmes stooped to raise one of these short



beams, then let it go, with a shuddering exclamation, for he had bent back an arm with Sergeant's stripes ... (7) Four NCOs had been killed by a single shell, one blown to pieces and another impaled on his own rifle.

The best protection was to go deeper into the ground, but to do so carried special dangers from gas, lack of ventilation, and difficulty in reaching the surface during attack. Cellars, mineworkings and brickstacks had all been used in an improvised manner since the earliest days, but by the second year

of the war new materials and plans were beginning to revolutionise dugout design.

Curved corrugated iron sheets known as 'elephants' were in use by 1916, and had a number of uses. The large elephant section of 1918 was an arch 6ft. 5in. high and 2ft. 9in. deep. When 21 such sections were bolted together with overlaps the 'Large English Elephant Shelter' was created, 9ft. wide and 17ft. 9in. long. (The earlier 'large' version was a fraction smaller). The 'Small Elephant' was similar in construction but only 3ft. 9in.

Officers of the 5th Bn., King's Liverpool Regiment in the trenches at Givenchy, March 1918. In this case the trench is revetted with posts, boards and wire netting. Direction boards are visible to the right at the junction of two trenches; and on the left is a signal rocket station, with three rockets in a wooden launcher. On several shoulders is the divisional sign of the 53th (West Lancashire) Division, a red rose on a khaki background. The subaltern, major and captain to the left wear their rank badges in the old style on the sleeve of the tunic whilst at least two others have their 'pips' mounted in the new manner on the shoulder. Several men have the latest 'Box Respirators', and the senior officers carry walking canes. (IWM Q10741)

Below:

Organisation of a defensive line, from Notes From the Front Part III, 1915, showing the part played in the overall scheme by dugouts and posts. There are two main trench lines between 100 and 400 yards apart, with an extra fire trench between them, and a support point to the rear of the second main line. Both main lines are supplied with lookout posts, MG posts and shelters. Latrines, cook house and aid post are dug off the communication trench joining the first and second lines.

high, 5ft. wide, and 12ft. 9in. long. Normally these were dug into the earth to form the roof of a chamber. The Royal Artillery in particular specified that their battery officer's dugouts be made from the 'Small Elephant', strengthened if need be with a frame, and covered with sandbags of stone or broken brick topped off with earth⁽⁸⁾.

Dugout frames were increasingly made away from the front by engineers, pioneers or local factories, and moved up the line in kit form. The best were wood-lined, equipped with bed-spreads, telephones — some officers even installed gramophones for entertainment. Even so, damp remained a perennial problem particularly in the deeper shelters; and this led to many tragedies through the use of charcoal braziers without adequate ventilation. (Chimneys to ventilate cookhouse and shelter dugouts were not feasible, since they would have revealed positions and degraded the integrity of overhead cover.) Many

Tank Corps men in a machine gun post at Marquais on the River Lys, April 1918. Here interesting use is made of a wooden loop let into a rough parapet. Like many machine gunners the Lewis gunner here carries a Webley pistol (probably the Mk VI) as secondary armament in a holster on his belt. In front of the sergeant are spare panniers of ammunition for the Lewis gun in a tin box. Both men wear the small tank badge on the shoulder; many tank crews were 'dismounted' and used as machine gunners in the attempt to stem the German spring offensive. (IWM Q6528)



Below:

A simple MG post from Notes From the Front, 1915, shown in section (A) and plan (B). The pit is a shallow excavation with a cutting into the forward wall for the tripod legs, and a recess in the right side wall for ammunition boxes. An embrasure allowing an arc of fire is cut into the parapet, allowing at least 18in. of side cover above ground level — '+' and '-' figures refer to above or below ground level. Steps lead down to the trench floor from the right near of the pit. (C) shows the general arrangement of an MG position in plan; ideally two splinter-proof dugouts were provided, one for ammunition and belt-filling and one for shelter from bombardment.

memoirs mention headaches caused by the 'fig' of braziers, and these fumes could be fatal.

Sheer depth was not the only counter to high explosive shells, nor sometimes the best. Heavier shells could penetrate the ground several feet before exploding to form a deep crater. Among the most feared was the 150mm field howitzer shell, known to the British as the '5.9'. What evolved as the text book counter was a sandwich construction with different layers to burst the shell, catch splinters and absorb shock. The ideal '5.9' shelter had five layers: (1) a bursting course to explode the shell, consisting of 2ft. of chalk or rubble, etc.; (2) a cushioned shock-absorbing layer of 3ft. of soil; (3) a distributing course to spread the shock, of logs or rails; (4) a second cushion layer; (5) a thin splinter-proof layer of brick, concrete or corrugated iron.

More than one entrance was best, provided if possible with long approaches and dog-legs. Given the right conditions, protection against all but super-heavy shells was


therefore possible at a depth of about ten feet⁽⁹⁾.

CONCRETE PILLBOXES

Concrete and reinforced concrete were comparative late-comers in dugout construction, but were so effective that many of the Germans' pioneering efforts survive in place to this day. Concrete was ideal both for shelters and for front line pillboxes, but the latter were not particularly widespread on the British side. As Col. E.G.L. Thurlow remarked in *The Pillboxes of Flanders*, the idea seems to have been current that 'such works were not worth the labour or the cost, but probably the real reason was the fear that a lack of offensive spirit might have been engendered if the troops had been provided with such solid defences'⁽¹⁰⁾.

It was also true that the Germans had the opportunity to build concrete pillbox belts behind their existing lines, and then fall back onto them as required. In any case, many of the British works were shelters rather than firing positions; in several cases they look very much like concrete versions of a Nissen hut — unsurprisingly, since they were often lined with 'elephant' shelters, and shuttered externally with sheets of corrugated iron during construction. (Good examples remain at Langhof Farm between St. Eloi and Bedford House cemetery, and at Warneeton near Messines.)

British concrete works were generally constructed of one part cement to two of sand and four of stone. Reinforcement with iron bars, expanded metal or wire ties considerably increased its shell-resisting capacity. Great care was necessary with the reinforcement because too large pieces of metal would actually begin to weaken the concrete by setting up lines of fracture. Properly executed reinforced concrete was the best medium available, as a mere 3ft. 6in. was capable of resisting the extraordinary power of the 210mm howitzer.




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A much more elaborate and ambitious permanent MG post layout, from Fieldworks for Pioneer Battalions, 1918. Here (A) an MG post forward of the trench line is linked to it by stairways and a tunnel 20ft. underground. Separate shelters are provided for the officer and detachment at the deepest level. The gun is located at the top of a vertical timber-lined shaft (B), shown in plan and section, reached by a short ladder.

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
Sentry of the Worcestershire Regiment observing through a loop at Villers, August 1916. Here a lookout post has been constructed simply by building a 'trench block' of sandbags across the end of a trench and a hole created by using a plank as a lintel. The NCO wears regulation Pattern 1908 web equipment. An improvised cover (possibly a modified sock) is fitted over the mechanism of his SMLF rifle, and a single round of .303 in. ammunition is pushed into the leather sling. (IWM Q4100)



When building with concrete it was usual to form the work, be it a pillbox or defensive shelter, by means of wood or iron shuttering, effectively building up a mould and casting the concrete within it. Where this was not possible an alternative method existed whereby blocks could be precast and then moved forward and used as prefabricated units⁽¹¹⁾.


CONCEALMENT

Concealment and deception were certainly the best defence, and by the last year



M. G. EMPLACEMENT - DETAILS.

B



of the war each Corps had its own 'Camouflage Officer' having responsibility for the 'Corps Camouflage Dump' with its stock of materials, and a small factory. This latter produced bespoke items such as dummy trees, or nets cut and coloured to order.

Among the 'off the peg' items in the Corps store were 'fish netting' garnished with knots of canvas or islands of scrim, wire netting, posts, dummy heads and figures. These dummies filled many rôles: attracting sniper fire, deceiving the enemy into believing that a position was occupied, or that an attack was likely. Also available were three standard portable observation posts. These were the 'Oliver', like a small sentry box with an armoured section on top; the 'Roland' an armoured 'bread bin' affair on a stretcher; and the 'Beehive', an upturned bowl-like structure with a gauze panel in the front and an irregular cover for concealment⁽¹²⁾.

Sometimes it was even attempted to cover whole



sections of trenches or vulnerable track or road intersections with screens. Two different philosophies could be employed, as explained in *Notes on Screens* in July 1917. Either a large and obvious screen could be used, in which case the enemy had to

Above:


British lieutenant in a captured German concrete pillbox near Mametz, August 1916. Captured concrete works were used whenever possible, but presented the problem that the entrances faced the wrong way; like trenches with the fire step on the wrong side, this made them vulnerable to swift counterattack. Entrances were also a nuisance when it came to bombardment, as was the case at the celebrated 'Cheddar Villa', which became something of a death trap after its capture in July 1917.

Among the debris outside this example are German messatins, spade, MG belt, and flare pistol. To the right of the entrance are propped five SMLEs with an assortment of breech and muzzle covers. That with a leather sling is

adorned with a couple of extra rounds of ammunition. (IWM Q870)

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
Details of dugout entrances, and section of a dugout, from Fieldworks for Pioneer Battalions, 1918. The main enemies of dugout builders were gas (which was heavier than air, and sank to fill any concavity), and water. The entrances have raised sills to prevent water pouring straight down the steps from the trench floor, and gas curtains, indicated here as rolled up. The chamber section shows a cement floor, a framework of 6ft. pit props and 5in. x 3in. 'I'-section RSJs, corrugated iron, and outer timber skinning or lagging. None of these methods eliminated the risks and discomforts, but they did decrease them.



decide whether it really did conceal anything and if so how much ammunition to waste on its destruction: or the attempt could be made to

conceal the screen itself. These 'subtle' screens could have scenery painted on them, or be interwoven with grass or brushwood to mimic

METHOD OF WATERPROOFING CHAMBERS



Right: Battalion Headquarters dugout complex, 2nd Battalion, Manchester Regiment, 14th Brigade, 32nd Division, winter 1917/18.



Paul Hannon's reconstruction shows a typical HQ layout for this period of the war, though details of materials and construction varied due to position, soil composition, availability of materials and regimental or divisional requirements. A series of corrugated iron shelter chambers, accommodating officers, signals room, kitchen and sleeping quarters are connected to a central corridor about 110ft. long, which connects with the surface by three steep wood-lined stairways, their entrances protected by gas curtains. Dugouts were constructed on the 'lee' side of communication trenches, so as not to present entrances directly to the main line of enemy shellfire.

Our representative unit, the 2nd Manchesters, served as part of 14th Bde., 32nd Division until February 1918. The division had crossed to France in November 1915 and remained there for the duration. An earlier scheme of divisional insignia involving various shapes cut out of scarlet tunic cloth had apparently led to the formation being nicknamed 'the Red Division' by the enemy, but in 1917/18 no divisional insignia were worn by the battalions.

The battalions of 14th Bde. were the 5th/6th Royal Scots, 1st Dorsets, 2nd Manchesters, and 15th Highland Light Infantry (an odd mixture of Regular, Territorial and 'New Army' units). All four wore the brigade sign of a red diamond 3in. deep by 2in. wide. The battalions wore below this one, two, three and four bars respectively, 1½in. x ¼in., or ¼in. intervals. (The Dorsets wore a red-on-blue title at the top of the sleeve, additionally.) The bars were coloured to indicate companies, in the same sequence throughout the brigade: A Co., red; B Co., green; C Co., yellow; D Co., light blue; and Bu. HQ (not a company), black.

the surroundings. They were most effective as temporary cover for a battery or a small working party⁽¹³⁾.

Natural concealment was even more desirable where it could be obtained; folds in the ground, woods and hedge lines were frequently adopted, but there were also more devious ploys. Sheds and haystacks could both be contrived to remain standing while MG positions and observation posts were built inside. At Hussar Farm just outside Ypres the deception was employed on a larger




To Front Line

Headquarters with Accommodation for 28 men.




STANDARD DUGOUT ACCOMMODATION FOR HEAD QUARTERS.



Above:
Standard command dugout plan from Fieldworks for Pioneer Battalions, 1918. As can be seen, it was intended that the same basic 'building blocks' of rooms could be used to make up different types of HQ.

Below:
Side and end sections through a 'cut and cover' dugout of sandwich construction. This example has no less than six wire-mesh layers above the corrugated iron 'elephant' section: three of earth, one each of pit props and concrete, and a chalk rubble course just beneath the earth surface to act as a 'bursting' layer.



scale by the Royal Engineers; here a strongpoint was constructed inside an existing farm building using concrete and brick, reinforced with railway line.

Dummy positions were particularly useful in absorbing punishing fire which would otherwise be directed at real posts. At their simplest these were merely lines of newly turned earth or

National Army Museum reconstruction showing a major of the South Staffordshire Regiment in a dugout, c1916. This is obviously one of the more civilised examples, having both boarded floor and walls and equipped with folding camp furniture. On the back wall are visible a hatch-covered trench periscope and a respirator; on the right hand wall hangs a Webley MkVI revolver fitted with the unusual 'Pritchard-Gravener' bayonet for trench fighting. (NAM 63266)



dummy loopholes, sometimes with old rifle barrels projecting, or glass to reflect the light like a periscope or binoculars. At the other end of the scale pillboxes were built of earth and then covered with cement plaster. Less permanent versions were wholly constructed of canvas and wood. Trackways and communication trenches often betrayed the presence of real posts, so it was common practice to cover the real tracks and make others to dummy positions⁽¹⁴⁾. MI

Eye Deep in Hell?
While it is true that the trench and dugout building methods examined in both parts of this article were ideals, and seldom obtained with the precision that the General Staff would have liked, it is fair to say that the trenches occupied by the British Army in 1914-1918 constituted a system based on a coherent plan. Very often the plan was reduced to chaos by rain, Minnenwerfer, and barrage; but even the shallowest of ditches was alive with working parties repairing, redesigning and amassing dumps of trench stores. We are used to descriptions of the trenches as a form of hell, but they were also a very methodical form of madness.

Notes
(1) *Manual of Field Engineering*, 1911, p.29-30.
(2) *ibid.* p.32. See also 'Military Illustrated' Nos. 14 p.10, and 22 p.23.
(3) *Notes From the Front Part III* 1915, *passim*
(4) *Notes Compiled by the Experiments Committee*, second series 1915, unpaginated.
(5) *Notes on the Tactical Employment of Machine Guns and Lewis Guns*, 1916, p.14-15.
(6) H. McBride, *A Rifleman went to War*, reprinted Mount Ida, USA, 1987, p.299-329.
(7) E. C. Vaughn, *Some Desperate Glory*, London 1981, p.44-48.
(8) *Fieldworks for Royal Artillery*, May 1918, pp.8-18.
(9) *Fieldworks for Pioneer Battalions*, 1918, pp.21-22.
(10) E.G.L. Thurlow, *The Pillboxes of Flanders*, London 1933, p.12.
(11) *Fieldworks for Pioneer Battalions*, 1918, pp.28-32.
(12) *The Principles and Practice of Camouflage*, March 1918, pp.17-22.
(13) *Notes on Sirens*, July 1917, *passim*.
(14) *Fieldworks for Pioneer Battalions*, 1918, pp.19-21.

The Rani of Jhansi

PHILIP J. HAYTHORNTHWAITE

Painting by ANGUS McBRIDE

By any standards Lakshmi Bai, Rani of Jhansi (c. 1828–58) was a most unusual military commander. That she was literate, articulate and politically skilled was singular enough in mid-19th century India, where the rôle of women was basically one of subservience; that she was also skilled in sword-play and the command of troops is even more amazing.

Lakshmi Bai's early life is unclear; she may have been raised with the boys at the court of the exiled Peshwa at Bithur, where her father was an official, and may have learned her skill with swords and horses alongside the Nana Sahib (the Peshwa's son) and Tantia Tope; but the facts are obscure. Her father, probably named Moropant Tambe, was the son of a Mahratta officer, and advisor to the brother of the Peshwa Baji Rao II; his only child, a daughter named Manakarnika (known as 'Mami'), adopted the name Lakshmi Bai on her wedding. She was married in 1842 to Gangadhar Rao, Rajah of Jhansi, an important and pro-British central Indian state, when she was about 14 — older than usual for an Indian bride; so that at the time of her death in 1858 she was probably around 30 years of age, though her attractive appearance led to an estimate of 'about 24'.

Gangadhar Rao was a sensitive, scholarly man much older than his bride. Being a widower with no heir he was anxious that his new wife should provide him with a son; which duly occurred; but the child died after three months, and no further children were born. In November 1853 Gangadhar Rao himself died, adopting a five-year-old relative as his heir on the day before his death. The arrangement

made with Jhansi's British Political Agent allowed Lakshmi Bai to rule Jhansi during her lifetime, with the heir Damodar presumably succeeding. Nevertheless, despite the Rani's obvious capabilities, Lord Dalhousie (Governor-General of India since 1847) decided to annex Jhansi, depriving the ruling family of their rights. The accommodation offered was generous — a handsome annual pension and a palace for the Rani, and all the late Rajah's personal wealth to the heir upon his coming of age; but Lakshmi Bai obviously regarded this as no substitute for independent rule of the state she believed to be her inheritance by marriage. Even so she seems to have made every effort to remain on good terms with the British administrators of Jhansi, at least until the great mutiny of 1857.

THE GREAT MUTINY

When news of the first outbreak reached Jhansi, such was the trust reposed in the Rani as a loyal supporter of the British that her offer to raise a corps for her own protection was accepted readily. On 6 June 1857 the 12th Bengal Native Infantry mutinied in Jhansi; murdered those of their officers they could find (along with the two native *havildars* who had remained loyal); and held a meeting with the Rani's supporters to decide what should be done about the succession and the small number of Europeans besieged in Jhansi fort.

This band dwindled in numbers as they beat off mutineer attacks and as envoys to the Rani were murdered before they could reach her; and with their situation hopeless, they surrendered on the guarantee of free passage to safety. All but one were massacred immediately — 30 men, 16 women and 20 children. It is doubtful whether the Rani was implicated in any way; conceivably she guaranteed them safe conduct but had no power to enforce it, was helpless before the mutineers, and had to pay them a ransom to quit Jhansi. Nevertheless, when she reported to the British what had happened it was believed that she was culpable despite her protestations of loyalty.

For a brief period Lakshmi Bai assumed the rule of Jhansi; she formed her own

army, including the enlistment of women in both supportive and combatant rôles, as if to solidify her own position as a woman ruler by involving the other women of Jhansi in the effort of communal security. Almost immediately, with the British presence suspended, two neighbouring rulers attempted to repay old grievances. The Dewan of Orchha sent an army to capture Jhansi; the Rani, commanding her own forces in person, decoyed them into range of her fortress artillery and routed them, proof of a military skill which exceeded that of her male opponents.

With this threat negated, she enlarged her army (including the enlistment of mutineers) to face the expected British threat. Determined to avenge the massacre, Sir Hugh Rose arrived before Jhansi on 21 March 1858; but not until the actual appearance of this army, and until her final protestations of loyalty were rejected, did the Rani — and possibly with some reluctance — decide to fight.

After ten days of British bombardment of Jhansi Tantia Tope's rebel army attempted to relieve the Rani's garrison, but was routed by Rose; and on 3 April the city was carried by assault with the death of some 5,000 of the inhabitants.

A stylised portrait of the Rani, not taken from life but executed shortly after her death, c. 1860. (Reproduced by courtesy of The British Library)



'Everything indicated a general and determined resistance; this was not surprising, as the inhabitants, from the Rani downwards, were more or less concerned in the murder and plunder of the English. There was hardly a house in Jhansi which did not contain some article of English plunder, and, politically speaking, the rebel confederacy knew well, that if Jhansi, the richest Hindoo city and most important fortress in central India fell, the cause of the insurgents in this part of India fell also'⁽¹⁾.

Captured in the fall of the city were the Rani's standards, which ironically included a silk Union Flag presented to the Rani's husband's grandfather as a reward of loyalty, with permission to carry it — a singular privilege. Rose reported that in one attempted break-out from the city the Rani's father, 'Manoo Sahab' (sic), had been wounded and captured, and that he was promptly hanged. The Rani and a number of followers escaped, to be pursued by elements of Rose's force; caught at Banda, 20 miles away, most were killed and her saddle was captured, but the redoubtable Rani escaped again.

THE LAST FIGHT

After the fall of Jhansi the Rani joined the Rao Sahib (nephew of the Nana Sahib), and attacked Rose's forces at Kalpi on 22 May; but the rebels were again overthrown. Joined by Tantia Tope, the Rani proposed to march on Gwalior to persuade Maharajah Sindhia to forsake his British allegiance and join the rebellion. The Maharajah remained loyal but his troops deserted *en masse*, swelling the rebel army; Gwalior was looted, the Maharajah's fabled pearl necklace being appropriated by the Rani herself.

On 17 June 1858 Rose surprised the rebels at Kotah-ki-Serai. The Rani was apparently drinking sherbert with her followers when a squadron of the 8th Hussars burst

upon them. She mounted immediately and attempted to stem the flight of her troops, supposedly fighting with a sword in each hand and the reins in her teeth — not an impossible feat, as a supposed eye-witness reported her practising this unusual style of fighting twice a week in the palace gardens of Jhansi. At some point in the mêlée the Rani was shot either in the back or the side, reputedly by a trooper of the 8th Hussars; one account claims that she turned and fired back at her assailant, who then delivered a sabre-blow, probably to the head.

The Rani rode away, but lived for only a few minutes more. She reputedly distributed Sindhia's pearls among her companions, one of whom, a maid of great beauty, was shot and mortally wounded riding by her side. The Rani's body was cremated a short time later, but the ceremonies were unfinished when the 8th Hussars intervened and drove away those attending.

* * *

It is surely not just Victorian sentiment which led British witnesses to portray the Rani in a heroic light; in fact, she does appear to have been not only the most capable military leader of the rebel forces, but also the most resolute and determined member of the army. Her efforts to rally her fleeing troops in the last action prove her bravery beyond doubt, and there are ample evidences of her military and administrative skills, at least when compared with the ineptitude of most of her collaborators. Even a very pro-British contemporary account, which proclaims her 'extreme cunning' and 'the cruel and treacherous character of the artful woman', still acknowledges her 'indomitable spirit', and that 'nor was there at any time . . . any symptoms of weakness or vacillation on her part'.

The same account states that her protestation of loyalty to Rose was met with

a message that she should not try to seek an interview, as 'she would, although a woman and a princess, most assuredly be hanged, in just retribution for the murders committed by her orders'⁽²⁾. Whether she was actually at all culpable for the massacre at Jhansi, and whether she would have joined the rebels had the British behaved in a fairer manner over the succession of Jhansi and later when Rose advanced on the city, is impossible to decide with certainty. The probability must be in the negative in both cases; but the doubts remain. Sir Owen Tudor Byrne, once the C-in-C India's military secretary, described her in his *Clyde and Strathmairn* (London 1895) as the 'Indian Joan of Arc', and surely no title is more fitting for this truly remarkable woman.

Costume

The appearance of the Rani is recorded in a number of illustrations, but it is uncertain which were taken from life and which were posthumous. However, there are several eye-witness descriptions of both her ordinary dress and the 'military' attire which she wore on campaign.

John Lang, the lawyer she consulted about the Jhansi succession, described her as 'about middle size, rather stout but not too stout. Her face must have been very handsome when she was younger, and even now it had many charms . . . The expression was also very good and very intelligent. The eyes were particularly fine and the nose very delicately shaped. She was not very fair, though she was far from black . . . Her dress was plain white muslin, so fine in texture and drawn about her in such a way that the outline of her figure was plainly discernible — and a remarkably fine figure she had. What spoiled her was her voice'⁽³⁾. Other descriptions note that she was marked with smallpox, but that this was offset by her eyes and figure; that she wore little jewellery save gold anklets and Sindhia's

pearl necklace in the last campaign, though she is described as wearing a small red silk cap embroidered with jewels.

Even in 'civilian' dress she is described as wearing a tight waist-belt covered in gold embroidery, into which were stuck two silver-mounted pistols and a small dagger, accessories which appeared somewhat incongruous with the décolleté bodice she wore. On campaign she forsook feminine dress completely, wearing a silk turban over a cap (Byrne describes it as white), a silk blouse, and either loose trousers or close-fitting breeches like johdpurs; Byrne notes her wearing a red jacket and trousers. A girdle or cummerbund with a jewelled sword, and sometimes the brace of pistols, are also recorded. One early portrait depicts the Rani armoured with a *char aina* (breast-, back- and side-plates), *bazubands* (armoured arm-guard), and *dhal* (small, circular shield or buckler); but such items of armour are not mentioned in contemporary descriptions, and they were probably depicted for no more reason than to emphasize the military bearing of the Rani, in the same way as European royal portraits even to the late 18th century depict their subjects in full plate-armour. M

Footnotes

(1) Dispatch from Sir Hugh Rose to the Adjutant-General of the Army, Bombay, 30 April 1858; published in *London Gazette* 16 July 1858.

(2) *The History of the Indian Mutiny, giving a Detailed Account of the Sepoy Insurrection in India*, anon., London Printing & Publishing Co., n.d. (c.1858-59?), II pp. 289-90.

(3) *Wanderings in India*, London 1859, pp. 93-94; quoted in part in Smyth (p.15), and Hibbert (p.378).

Sources

The English biography is *The Rebellious Rani*, Brig. Rt.Hon. Sir John Smyth Bt. VC, London 1966 (which includes a most attractive portrait of the Rani in court dress). A leading Indian source is *The Rani of Jhansi*, D.V. Tahmankar, London 1958. An excellent background to the period is *The Great Mutiny: India 1857*, C. Hibbert, London 1978.

Lakshmi Bai

Rani of Jhansi,
17 June 1858



James Morehead's Medal: An Enigma of the Peninsular War

JOHN SYDNEY

Anyone who has enjoyed the rich tapestry of military history must have wondered sometimes about the individuals who participated in these events: where they came from, what made them do what they did, and perhaps even what happened to them after their military service was finished. It is likely, however, to require an encounter with some personal relic from the past before anyone is stimulated enough to take the time and trouble to research the career of a particular soldier; and given that the passage of time makes the discovery and conservation of tangible material from previous centuries increasingly more difficult, it is probable that that stimulus will be in the form of a named medal. This is the story of the research that one such medal set in train, and of the intriguing inconsistencies in the contemporary records that make the researching of a soldier's biography so fascinating.

The medal in this case was a Military General Service medal from the Peninsular War period named for JAMES MOREHEAD 11TH FOOT. It had seven battle clasps (more commonly called bars by collectors), the maximum number found for this regiment: *Busaco, Salamanca, Pyrenees, Nive, Nivelle, Orthes, Toulouse*. Having acquired this medal, I wanted to research it firstly to confirm its authenticity (i.e. that Morehead was entitled to those bars); and secondly to find out as much as I could about this man who had been present at his first battle in 1810, and had survived at least until 1847 (when the MGS medal was authorised to be awarded to survivors of the Peninsula campaign which had ended 33 years earlier).

The key place to visit was the Public Record Office (PRO) at Kew, where the nation's War Office records are held. The War Office archive is vast; but my interest was going to be limited initially to the MGS medal roll, and the service papers of those soldiers discharged to an out-pension from the

Royal Hospital, Chelsea. I found an apparent discrepancy as soon as I looked at the medal roll (PRO reference WO 100/5, folio 187). The roll certainly confirmed Morehead's entitlement to the seven bars on the medal; but added in the margin the word *Fuentes*, clearly referring to the award of a bar for the battle of Fuentes D'Onoro. The 11th Foot as a unit had never been entitled to this bar, and so I searched through the roll to see whether any other men had a similar marginal note. I found five more examples, and although these entries did not confirm that the men were entitled to the bar, it certainly implied that they were.

I then looked to see whether there were any pension papers for Morehead. Theoretically, for every soldier who was discharged to a Chelsea pension there is on file a copy of a document detailing the man's service: places of birth, enlistment and discharge; age on enlistment and discharge; trade; and various other personal details such as a physical des-

cription (to prevent fraud in an age of overwhelming illiteracy when only the minority of the working classes could even sign their own names). These papers also record whether a man was wounded or not, and the gravity of the wound, as its incapacitating effects were a factor in assessing the rate of the man's pension. Unfortunately there are no such papers for men who did not qualify for pension.

In this case I was gratified to find that not only had papers survived for Morehead, but that their content was extremely rewarding (WO 97/329). Morehead turned out to be a weaver born at Ballinasloe who had enlisted 9 August 1809 at Strabane, Northern Ireland, and was eventually discharged to pension aged 41 on 9 May 1831 'at his own request'. On the papers it quite clearly states that he was present at 'the battles of Salamanca, Busaco, Torres Vedras, Blockade of Almeida, Fuentes D'Onoro, Forts of Salamanca, Siege of the Castle of Burgos, of Pampeluna, Nirdash, Sahugal, Pyrenees, Nivelle, Nive, Orthes and Toulouse' (my italics).

The medal roll of 1847 and the pension papers of 1832 would therefore appear to agree that James Morehead was entitled to the bar *Fuentes D'Onor* (sic). However, the medal is clearly one of seven bars only, and shows no signs of having been tampered with in any way. The problem was therefore to reconcile the apparent entitlement of this soldier to a bar for a battle — Fuentes D'Onoro, fought 3–5 May 1811 — to which his unit as a whole was not entitled, a soldier whose medal indicates that it had never been awarded to him.

CONTRADICTORY ACCOUNTS

In May 1811 the 1st Battalion of the 11th Foot was part of the 6th Division blockading

the fortress of Almeida; the battle of Fuentes D'Onoro, initiated by Massena to relieve the fortress, was centred on the eponymous village some ten miles away. According to Roger Robinson in his new history of the Devon Regiment (*The Bloody Eleventh*, vol. 1, Wyvern Barracks, Exeter 1988), Wellington placed '... 5 Division about a mile south of Fort Concepcion and 6 Division two miles south of that, overlooking the bridge across the Dos Casas on the Almeida-San Pedro road between the two rivers. Here they would prevent the enemy convoy of provisions from reaching Almeida by passing round the allied left flank'. The fight on 5 May was characterised by two crucial and dramatic episodes, both occurring at the southern, or right, flank of the Allied position. The first was Massena's attempt to outflank Wellington to the south, and the subsequent fighting retreat of the 7th Division, covered by the Light Division, across an open plain. The second was the French attack on the village itself, and the counter-attacking charge of the 88th, 74th and 45th Regiments which cleared the village and held it till the end of the day.

In no account of the battle that I have read were the 1/11th Foot in particular, or the 6th Division in general, mentioned — except one: Richard Cannon's, in his *Historical Records of the British Army* published in 1845: 'The Eleventh were in reserve during the early part of the action ... but were afterwards moved to the support of the Forty-Second Royal Highlanders, who were engaged with superior numbers; on the French seeing the advance of the regiment, they retired'.

This is an almost incredible statement. The attack by French cavalry on the 2/42nd took place virtually at the end of the Light Division's retreat



Obverse, reverse, and detail of the naming of the James Morehead Military General Service Medal.

and the consolidation of the 7th Division at Frenada, both on the extreme right of the Allied line. In order to support the 2/42nd the 1/11th would have had to cross the entire battlefield, a distance of up to ten miles, in an impossibly short space of time. Robinson stated quite cate-

gorically and authoritatively that 'Massena made a demonstration opposite 5 and 6 Divisions' positions, but there was no engagement. . . 5 and 6 Divisions remained where they were and uncommitted'. Cannon's fanciful and misleading narrative is best disregarded.

Having considered the course of the engagement at Fuentes I was able to understand how any soldier serving in the 5th or 6th Divisions could consider himself to have been present at the battle, albeit peripherally, and not involved in the fighting as such; indeed, Arthur Bryant

recorded (in his *Years of Victory*, Collins 1967) that this was exactly what the French had intended, in that the demonstration across the Dos Casas by Reynier's 2nd Corps 'was to prevent the British 5th and 6th Divisions from moving to the aid of their engulfed right and

centre'. Then another complication in my research appeared: James Morehead was apparently not even with his regiment on 5 May 1811!

In order to try to resolve this enigma I had turned to the muster rolls for the 1/11th Foot for the period of 25 March-24 June 1811 (WO 12/2850). These muster rolls, or paylists, were the regimental accounting system and, at the same time, a monument to British bureaucracy and parsimony. They have the advantage, however, of allowing researchers the opportunity to follow in detail, month by month, the pay record of individual soldiers. Each man in the battalion was listed, and his presence with, or absence from, his unit each 24th day of the month was noted, because it could affect his pay and allowances. James Morehead was mustered for April, May and June as 'S. Santarem'; a glance through the rest of the roll indicated that the 'S' was almost certainly an abbreviation for 'Sick', and that this applied to a considerable number of men in the 1/11th at this time. They seem to have been spread over five main locations; Santarem, Celorico, Abrantes, Coimbra and Lisbon, with the main body of the battalion being located simply 'in Portugal' for the final (June) muster of that quarter.

It is quite clear from Roger Robinson's account why the casualty rate was so high. In March 1811 Wellington began to pursue Massena's army retreating from the lines of Torres Vedras, and this manoeuvre developed into a 340-mile chase, ending on 3 April with the action at Sabugal in which the 11th

Right:

Part of the pension record of Morehead's service now held by the Public Record Office, reference WO 97/329. Apart from other interesting details, it shows that in 21 years' service Morehead was promoted corporal no less than five times, and 'busted' again with equally monotonous regularity, on the last occasion after having worn his stripes for only 47 days. (Crown copyright; by permission of the Controller, HMSO)

D.

HIS MAJESTY'S

11th REGT. OF *Foot*

Whereof *Sir Genl Sir A. Montrepor K.C.B.* is Colonel.

No. *James Morehead Private.*

BORN in the Parish of *Ballinasloe* in or near the Town of *Ballinasloe* in the County of *Galway* by Trade a *Weaver*

ATTESTED for the *11th* Regiment of *Foot* at *Strabane* in the County of *Derry* on the *9th of Aug^r 1809* at the Age of *Twenty Years*

1st. SERVICE. AFTER the Age of 18 Years, which he is entitled to reckon up to the *31st of March 1831* is Twenty One Years and Two Hundred and Thirty Seven Days.

Regiment.	Promotions, Reductions, &c.	Rank.	Period of Service in each Rank.		Amount of Service.	
			From	To	Years.	Days.
<i>11th Foot</i>		<i>Private</i>	<i>9th Aug^r 1809</i>	<i>25th Sep^r 1812</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>48</i>
	<i>Promoted</i>	<i>Corporal</i>	<i>25th Sep^r 1812</i>	<i>9th Aug^r 1815</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>318</i>
	<i>Reduced</i>	<i>Private</i>	<i>16th Sep^r 1815</i>	<i>26th Aug^r 1818</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>17</i>
	<i>Promoted</i>	<i>Corporal</i>	<i>26th Aug^r 1818</i>	<i>22nd Oct^r 1820</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>87</i>
	<i>Reduced</i>	<i>Private</i>	<i>3rd Oct^r 1820</i>	<i>8th Nov^r 1822</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>37</i>
	<i>Promoted</i>	<i>Corporal</i>	<i>9th Nov^r 1822</i>	<i>2nd March 1824</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>146</i>
	<i>Reduced</i>	<i>Private</i>	<i>2nd March 1824</i>	<i>1st July 1825</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>187</i>
	<i>Promoted</i>	<i>Corporal</i>	<i>1st July 1825</i>	<i>15th June 1826</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>336</i>
	<i>Reduced</i>	<i>Private</i>	<i>14th June 1826</i>	<i>28th Sep^r 1826</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>105</i>
	<i>Promoted</i>	<i>Corporal</i>	<i>28th Sep^r 1826</i>	<i>10th Feb^r 1827</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>47</i>
	<i>Reduced</i>	<i>Private</i>	<i>10th Feb^r 1827</i>	<i>31st March 1831</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>50</i>

For Soldiers enlisted previous to the 15th March, 1818.

		From	To	Years.	Days.
INCHES	East				Half period
	West				Half period

* WATERLOO

Total of the foregoing Statement	21	237
Deduct		
Total Service up to the <i>31st March 1831</i>	21	237

Years.	Days.
<i>7</i>	<i>148</i>

A Non-commissioned Officer, enlisted after the 14th November, 1829, must have served not less than Three Years without interruption as such, immediately preceding his discharge. Vide Art. 6 of the Pensioner Regulations.

Of which, as Corporal

Sergeant

Sergeant-Major

Further Service from the *1st April 1832* to the *9th May 1832* when finally discharged

Total Service allowed to reckon to the day of final discharge

21 276

* To be erased, when not required, by drawing the Pen through the Lines.

SERVED. In the Peninsula about Four Years & a half, at Gibraltar Five Years, Portugal Fifteen Months, & for Three Years. Was present at the Battles of Salamanca, Busaco, Torres Vedras, Albuera, & Almaraz, Fuentes D'Aro, Siege of the Castle of Miguels & of Bomprehens, Red Bank, Sabugal, Pyrenees, Givelle, Nieve, Oporto & Lourenco. Wounded in the head at the attack on the Castle of Miguels, and at Lourenco. —

2nd.
DISABILITY,
or Cause of
Discharge.

at his own request receiving the regulated Pension. —

3rd.
CHARACTER.

The Regimental Board is of opinion, that his conduct has been that of a good and efficient Soldier trustworthy and sober. —

4th.
PAY and
CLOTHING.

He has received all just Demands from his Entry into the Service, up to the 31st of March 1831. —

I, James Morehead do acknowledge to have received all just demands from my entry into the Service, up to the 31st of March 1831. — *James Morehead*

Certified *J. Lubbock* Captain.

I CERTIFY that the foregoing Statements are correct Extracts from the Regimental Records, and the Proceedings of the Regimental Board.

W. Chamberlain Capt. Major, and President.

Confirmed by me,

W. H. H. H.

Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding.

Foot, in the 6th Division, played no more than a supporting rôle. However, the forced marching through difficult territory which the enemy had treated to a 'scorched earth' policy was bound to wear down the hunters as well as the hunted, and the divisions that invested Almeida at the beginning of April would obviously have been below strength.

Santarem is about 40 miles north-east of Lisbon, and Fuentes D'Onoro is some 150 miles further north-east of Santarem as the condor flies, on the modern Spanish-Portuguese border. In order to be present at Fuentes on 5 May and to have been mustered correctly at Santarem on 24 April and 24 May, Morehead would have had to cover 150 miles in a maximum of 11 days (25 April-5 May) on the outward trip, and the same distance in 19 days (6-24 May) on the return. Quite clearly, as the example of the march from Torres Vedras to Sabugal showed, it was not totally out of the question for Wellington's infantrymen to cover an average of 14 miles a day for 11 days, fight a battle, and then cover an average of eight miles a day for 19 days, even in the Iberian spring. Arthur Bryant (op.cit.) quotes the example of Sir Brent Spencer's four divisions in June 1811 marching 'twenty miles a day in heat so intense that more than one of the proud infantry of the Light Division dropped dead sooner than fall out . . .'. I would guess that Morehead could have carried out a forced march of the nature described if he were fit, but it seems to me highly doubtful that he could possibly have

Left:

The reverse of the previous sheet, with a summary of Morehead's service: 'In the Peninsula about Four Years & a half, at Gibraltar Five Years, Portugal Fifteen Months, Corsica Three Years.' Despite the migratory nature of Morehead's corporal's tapes, we have it on the authority of his officers that he was 'a good and efficient soldier, trustworthy and sober'. (Crown copy-right; by permission of the Controller, HMSO)

done so if he were sick; and anyway, for what conceivable purpose would such a march have been necessary for a nominally sick man?

A summary of evidence

In order to try to draw some reasonable conclusions I looked again at my three strands of evidence: muster roll, discharge papers and medal roll. The earliest of these documents is the muster roll, which was absolutely contemporary with events; this should surely be trustworthy, as it was an official record of the disbursement of funds. Even in this case, however, the record could be corrupt: if not a deliberate in-truth perpetrated to defraud, a genuine mistake could have been made on the basis of unreliable information. The Paymaster or (more likely) his clerk, in the middle of an arduous campaign, was not going to concern himself overmuch with detail as long as the man was still on the regimental payroll; in fact, Robinson quotes the case of the 11th's Paymaster failing to muster the battalion on 24 March 1811 because he could not overtake it on the road north from Lisbon.

The next documents chronologically are the discharge papers. Perhaps the first question to ask here is: who supplied the information about Morehead's service career? The papers record (in pre-printed format) that the Board had 'personally examined and compared the Regimental Records, the Soldiers's Book and other documents' in coming to its decision. The soldier's book must now be presumed lost to history, and its accuracy therefore indeterminate. What the 'other documents' were one can only speculate: possibly casualty returns (Morehead was recorded as having been wounded in the head at Burgos and Toulouse), and almost certainly a record of defaulters. For all we know, much of the information on 'services' may have been provided by the soldier himself (Morehead's stated presence at Sabugal falling into the same category

as Fuentes); and memory can play tricks over more than 20 years.

Last comes the medal roll. The authorities who put together the particular roll now immortalised on microfilm at Kew would presumably by then (1847) have at least the sources already described, as well as 'other documents' which we must presume not to be available now. I suspect that the original claim from Morehead included 'Fuentes D'Onoro' and that this was investigated. The pay lists would seem to rule it out; but it did appear on his papers signed by the discharge board, and this must have carried some weight. I guess that the authorities believed the paylists rather than the discharge documents; but they could not totally ignore the claim, and so withheld the bar while noting the claim in the margin of the roll.

I therefore came to the disappointing conclusion that James Morehead had not been entitled to the bar for Fuentes. However, there is small addendum to the story. I mentioned earlier that five men other than Morehead had 'Fuentes D'Onoro' recorded as a marginal note. The roll of the 11th Foot is littered with marginal notes of this kind, and most of them are struck through. The five men whose assumed claims for Fuentes were not thus deleted were James Bun-gay, Thomas Carnall and Lawrence Morrison (all three entitled to the MGS medal with the bars Busaco/Salamanca); John Keating (same as Morehead minus Nive); and James Jervise (single bar Busaco). I researched these names on the muster roll for the two crucial musters of 24 April and 24 May 1811. Bun-gay, Carnall, Morrison and Keating were apparently present with the regiment, and therefore could claim to have been 'in action' at Fuentes. Jervise, however, was 'S. Santarem' for both musters exactly like Morehead. I'd love to know what those two were really doing on 5 May 1811.

MI

The London Trained Bands and the English Civil War (2)

KEITH ROBERTS

Paintings by RICHARD HOOK

The first part of this article (*MP* No.22) described the evolution of the London Trained Bands between the aftermath of the Armada crisis and the eve of the Civil War. This concluding part covers the war years.

RE-ORGANISATION

As the threat of Spanish invasion receded the London Militia abandoned their former regimental organisation, and the four regiments were not reformed until 1616. Once again these were named the North, South, East and West Regiments after the areas of the City from which they were recruited; but on this occasion the recruiting boundaries differed slightly, and each regiment consisted of five companies of 300 men.

This system was retained until 1642, when the increasingly strained relations between king and Parliament were echoed within the Common Council of the City of London. This was the governing body of the City, composed of the Lord Mayor, the Aldermen and Common Councilmen elected from the City Wards. Traditionally control of the Militia was in the hands of the Lord Mayor, who was the only person with the authority to call them out; but distrust of the Royalist Lord Mayor of the time led the House of Commons to declare in January 1642 that it lay instead with a majority of the Common Council.

This was the first of a series of political moves which led to the appointment by the Common Council of Phillip Skippon, the Captain of the Artillery Garden, as commander of the London Trained Bands. Although Skippon now led the London Trained Bands, control of

them passed into the hands of a committee formed of the more radical members of the Common Council. This body, known as the Committee for London Militia, retained control during the Civil War. At the same time the regiments were reorganised from 20 companies divided amongst four regiments to 40 companies divided amongst six regiments. The new regiments were known as the Red, White, Yellow, Blue, Green and Orange after the colour of their respective ensigns. The companies which formed them were recruited from adjoining wards within the City, so each regiment was still recruited from a particular area.

Officers for the new regiments were appointed by the Committee, but although it evidently had political considerations in mind, the choice was also influenced by the previous experience and ability of the candidates. The colonels of each regiment were Aldermen with little military experience; but each of the lieutenant colonels and sergeant majors had been a captain in the Trained Bands before the reorganisation. On campaign the regiments were led by their lieutenant colonels, as the colonels' lack of military ability made them more of a liability than an asset. (One colonel achieved unwanted notoriety following a ceremonial display at which he was so shocked by the sound of his musketeers



Richard Browne Esq. Major General of Oxon, Berkshire & Buckingham.



Phillip Skippon Esq. Major General of the Army etc.



Robert Earl of Essex his Excellency Lord General of the Parlt. Army etc. lately deceased.



Sir William Waller Major Gen: of Surrey, Sussex & Hampshire



Above:

Woodcuts, from John Leycester's *The Civill Warres* (1649), of four leading Parliamentary generals who had London Trained Band units under command during the war: the Earl of Essex, Phillip Skippon, Sir William Waller and Richard Browne. (Author's collection)

firing that he soiled himself whilst at the head of his regiment.)

THE WAR BEGINS

The first muster of the six regiments took place on 10 May 1642, when they appear to have turned out their full establishment strength of 8,000 men. The same men marched out in November to face the King's Army at

Turnham Green; and the question arises as to why they were prepared to fight for Parliament.

The answer, arguably, lies in the general fear in the City that the King's Army would plunder it if they forced their way in. The recent sack of Brentford, with the loss of many London soldiers in the regiments of Denzil Holles and Lord Brooke, would have supported this view,

and pamphlets circulating in the City warned of the danger. It is likely, therefore, that the Trained Bands marched to Turnham Green to defend their homes rather than the Houses of Parliament.

After peace negotiations with the king broke down in

Below:

A statuette of a drummer, c.1638, from Cromwell House, Highgate; this shows the appearance of a Trained Band drummer of the Civil War period. Note the underarm carriage of the heavy drum. At this period a drummer would be a mature and, ideally, a resourceful man; he might be entrusted with messages for the enemy in the manner of a medieval herald, and would be expected to use his eyes and memory intelligently whilst delivering them. (By courtesy of the Board of Trustees, Royal Armouries)



William Levett's Report: 26 September 1643

William Levett, who is believed to have been a Royalist spy, made a record of the Ensigns and the number of men he saw at a muster of the Trained Bands and Auxiliaries of London and its suburbs. He estimated the strength of the Auxiliary Regiments at 1,000 men each (except the Green Auxiliaries at 1,200 men); and considered that the Red and the Blue Trained Bands, then on their way home from the Battle of Newbury, might muster the same number once they had recruited replacements for their casualties. Levett made a detailed record of the following regiments; note that 'officers' included corporals, sergeants, musicians, etc.

	Officers	Musketeers	Pikemen	Total
White Regiment	About 70	600	520	1,190
Yellow Regiment	About 70	506	448	1,024
Green Regiment	About 63	503	297	863
Orange Regiment	About 70	630	408	1,101
Southwark T.B.	About 70	868	456	1,394
Westminster T.B.	About 80	1084	854	2,018
Tower Hamlets T.B.	About 70	819	385	1,304

London Militia retained overall control of both Trained Bands and Auxiliaries, and officers could only be appointed with their consent.

The second development was the addition of the Trained Bands of the Tower Hamlets, the Burrough of Southwark and the City of Westminster to those already under the jurisdiction of the Committee. The object of this was to place all the Militia within the new fortifications under one authority. By July 1643 these suburban Trained Bands and the Auxiliary regiments raised alongside them were all under the control of the Committee. This re-organisation gave the Committee control over 18 regiments of infantry, nine of Trained Bands and nine of Auxiliaries. A report on a muster held in September 1643 made by one William Levett, a Royalist spy, estimated the

strength of nine Trained Band and seven Auxiliary regiments as 18,094 officers and men; so if allowance is made for the two missing Auxiliary regiments, it is likely the Committee controlled a force of some 20,000 infantry at this time. In addition there were also two regiments of City Horse under the jurisdiction of the Committee. Six independent troops had been raised in the autumn of 1642, and formed into a regiment under Colonel Edmund Harvey the following year. A second regiment of eight troops was raised under Colonel Richard Turner in August 1643.

The military impact of the Trained Bands

Although this represented a massive force by the standards of the time, it could not all be used at the same time. The City itself had to be defended, and the soldiers


Sergeant Majors' Colours Trained Band Regiments




White Regiment




Red Regiment




Orange Regiment




Yellow Regiment




Green Regiment



Blue Regiment



Southwark C.B.*



Westminster C.B.



Tower Hamlets C.B.

* First Captain's Colour

Fig 17



had their own trades and businesses which would suffer if they were absent too long. The support of the City Militia was limited to the despatch of brigades of two or three regiments to the armies of the Earl of Essex, Sir William Waller and Richard Browne. So crucial was their support that during the latter part of 1643 and the whole of 1644 neither the Earl of Essex nor Sir William Waller had sufficient infantry to take the field without a brigade of City Militia.

Both Waller and Richard Browne complained on occasion of the strength of the Auxiliary regiments allotted to them; but the City regiments were usually stronger than units of the regular army, since they could be recruited between campaigns, and since the only way to desert permanently was to leave the City. The size of the City Militia regiments gave them an advantage, and they usually fought well, notably at the First Battle of New-

Above:

Ensigns of the Trained Band Regiments of the City of London and its suburbs. Each company of the regiment carried its own flag — 'Colour' or 'Ensign' — and each regiment followed a company identification system based on different numbers of repeated symbols on a background of the regiment's name colour. The colonel's colour was plain; the lieutenant colonel's and all other colours bore a St. George's Cross in the upper hoist canton. The sergeant major's horn a single example of the repeat device used by the regiment — a disc, star, etc. The first captain's company colour bore two of these devices, and so on. The regular Army followed a slightly different sequence, with a single wavy 'flame' slanting from the St. George's Cross to distinguish the sergeant major's company, a single regimental device for the first captain's company, and so on.

The ensigns illustrated here by Les Prince are in each case that of the sergeant major's company, except in the case of the Southwark Trained Bands; this regiment followed regular Army practice, so the colour shown is that of the first captain's company. In the Red Regiment the repeat device was the wavy 'flame'. (For further information see 'London and Liberty: The Ensigns of the London Trained Bands' by K.A.B. Roberts, ill. Les Prince, published by Pottizan Press)



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Richard Hook's colour reconstructions opposite show 'officers' of a company of the White Regiment of the London Trained Bands, c.1642.

A company at full strength in London had a complement of 200 soldiers plus officers. 'This word was used loosely in the 17th century to refer to anyone who held a position other than common soldier. The company officers included the commander, his lieutenant and his ensign as 'commission officers', four sergeants, two drummers, and a 'marshal'.

(1) Fifer

This figure is based on another of the statuettes from Cromwell House, and shows the style of drummer musician's coat worn by both drummers and fifers. While this example shows relatively modest trim, with silver lace and ribbons, it was a point of honour to have richly dressed musicians; a newly appointed captain in the Trained Bands received £20.00 from the City towards the expense of 'Colours, Drums and other charges'. Although drummers were allowed in the company establishment, and so would be paid if the company went on campaign, the fifers were a charge on the captain's own pocket. 'This man plays his fife, standing in what was evidently a classic pose. A shambler belt supports his fife-case, and a second sword — more to show his status as a soldier than for defence.

(2) Ensign

This ensign is based on an engraving dating from the mid-1630s

which decorates the spine of the 'Great Velium Book' of the Honourable Artillery Company (a record of membership), and his pose is typical. Both he and the sergeant wear the dress of prosperous citizens. The ensign — the term referring to both the colours, and the officer who bore them — was the focal point of the company, and the preservation of the colours was a point of honour: the officer was exhorted to protect them and 'not to stir from them . . . although he hazardeth his last drop of blood'. The ensign depicted is that of Capt. Edmund Harvey's Company, and the officer who carried it in May 1642 was Simon Hackett.

(3) Sergeant

The sergeant is also based on an engraving from the 'Great Velium Book', and one of the illustrations from a drill manual, *The Military Discipline*, whose author used members of the Artillery Company as his models. While officers in the Trained Bands — and indeed, throughout the armies of both king and Parliament — wore their own clothing rather than uniforms, this man is much better dressed than his peers in the regular regiments: even junior officers in the London Trained Bands were often very wealthy men. He wears a buff coat, richly laced; and his rank is indicated by his sash and by the hilt of the sword he carries casually over his shoulder. The riding boots are an indication of his social aspirations, even though he would serve on foot.

The VVelfsh-Mans Postures, OR,

The true manner how her doe exercise her company of Souldiers in her own Countrey in a warlike manners with some other new-found speciments, and pretty extravagants fitting for all Christian podies to caknow.



Printed in the year. When her did her enemy jecre, 1642.

Above:

Frontispiece of a satirical pamphlet printed after the Battle of Edgehill (1642). The text is a pornographic parody of the drill 'postures', and must be the first example of a pornographic drill book. The use of a military example for this type of brutal humour shows the importance of military works in contemporary popular culture. (British Library)

bury and the Battle of Cropredy Bridge.

The disadvantage was that these amateur soldiers heartily disliked the discomforts of campaigning, and were liable to desert if life became too uncomfortable. The regiments were also sent out by the Committee for a specific objective — such as the relief of Gloucester — or a specific period. Once the objective was achieved or their time of service was over the soldiers were quite likely to march home, with or without their general's permission and regardless of the military situation. This attitude did not endear them to the generals to whose armies they were attached, and Sir William Waller, in particular, had some rather bitter comments to make on this subject.

With the creation of the New Model Army the City

regiments were no longer so vital to the conduct of the war, and no new brigades matched out of the City. Essentially, the City Militia was strong enough to make the City impregnable if it would fight. As relations between Parliament and its victorious army deteriorated during 1647, a party within Parliament hoped to use the City Militia as the basis of a new force to counter the New Model Army. This force was to be composed of the City Militia regiments together with new regiments recruited from the disbanded soldiers who had flocked to London to seek their arrears of pay.

In order to strengthen its position Parliament supported a move by the Common Council to appoint a new Committee for London Militia which excluded sympathisers of the New Model.

The new Committee purged the officers of the City Militia, removing those they distrusted and appointing others in their places. The political manoeuvring of the Common Council reckoned without the feelings of the soldiers themselves. Except for the Trained Bands of the City of Westminster, most of the soldiers simply failed to turn up when the drums beat in the streets to muster the regiments to resist the New Model. Although they had felt committed to the fight against the king's armies the Militia were not prepared to suffer the hardships of another war which they evidently felt to be unnecessary.

Conclusion

The City Militia proved in its campaigns during the Civil War that it was willing and able to fight for a cause it believed in; but in 1647 the

soldiers felt no commitment in the dispute between Parliament and its rebellious army. Once the New Model marched into London the Committee for London Militia was purged once again and Army sympathisers reinstated. As an additional precaution, however, the City's defences were dismantled and the Tower of London garrisoned by the New Model. Military power in the City henceforth rested with the Army, not the Militia. **MD**

CLOSE UP

Freelance War Correspondents (2)

In the first part of this interview with freelance war correspondent/photographers JIM HOOPER and KEN GUEST (see 'MF' No.22, p.26) they described their background, and how they came to take up their demanding trade; the problems of access to campaigns in various parts of the world; the question of whether or not to carry weapons; and the motivation of the freelance war correspondent. The interview concludes with questions on the practical aspects, and actual dangers of their chosen profession.

THE RIGHT STUFF

MI: *What kind of kit do you favour when outfitting yourselves for a trip into an African or Asian campaign area — is most of it freely available?*

Jim Hooper: For the most part I use military surplus clothing: it's inexpensive, rugged, and makes a practical gift for my escent when I finish a trip. There are a few things that are marketed by Survival Aids that I take simply because they're more comfortable or easier to use. And make sure you have good, broken-in boots. I once made the mistake of going in on a two-month trip with new ones. They were damn good boots — but by the third day my feet were a mess, and all I could do was grit my teeth and keep on truckin'...

As soon as you start whinging you immediately begin to lose the confidence and respect of the people you're with — not to mention the possibility of putting their lives at greater risk because they have to slow down or change their plans. They've usually made a tremendous effort and taken a big gamble to accomodate you, and it's up to you to keep pace. It's no game where you can call 'Time out!' and take a break if things aren't to

your liking — when you're out there, the opposition isn't looking to spatter you with paint pellets. You're with their enemy, and they want to kill you, and if you can't keep up they just may get the chance. To increase the odds against you by neglecting to provide yourself with proper kit is just plain stupid.

Ken Guest: I tend to fall back on military surplus — mostly American, because I find it of superior quality. And I always take everything with me. If you try to buy locally-made produce when you arrive, it's invariably of poor



Angola, 1989: the faces of three UNITA soldiers reflect the exhaustion of a 30-mile final advance to battle, the routing of over 800 enemy troops and complete destruction of their base, and the first ten miles of a tactical retreat. The battalion commander carries a US-supplied M79 grenade launcher. (Jim Hooper)


quality, or simply not available. Particularly water bottles — there are some places where you desperately need them, in fact your life depends on them; so make sure you have good ones before you go.

Carry a small backpack; the bigger the pack, the more you'll be tempted to put in it. Make sure you can carry your load, because you may have

Jim Hooper, born in 1944, was raised in Corpus Christi, Texas, where his father was based as a US Navy flyer. His family background includes Confederate soldiers, and a gunslinger who rode with John Wesley Hardin. Jim served with the US Army 1964-68; and from 1969 to 1981 was first an instructor, later manager and owner, at the Zephyrhills Sports Parachute Center in Florida — he himself has made 3,000-plus jumps. He has lived in England for the past five years. Since 1984 he has made working trips to Chad, Uganda, and on three occasions into Angola with the UNITA rebels. He was the first Western journalist to enter the bush war on the Namibia-Angola border with virtually unrestricted access to combat operations, and was wounded twice during three tours totalling six months of operations with SWAPO-FIMU units.

Ken Guest was born in 1955 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. In 1974 he joined the Royal Marines, following

his father and elder brother (and followed by his younger brother). He served in Zulu Company, 45 RM Commando (Mountain & Arctic Warfare); and did a tour in N. Ireland in 1974. In 1977, following experience as a sports parachutist, he was a founder member of the RM free-fall Parachute Display Team, then doubling up as the Abseil Display Team doing 200ft. straight drops out of Wessex helicopters. Leaving the Marines in 1977, he made his first trip to a combat zone as a freelance war correspondent/photographer in 1980; this first trip to Afghanistan has been followed by 18 more, and he has spent more than two years inside that country during the ten-year war against the Soviet army. He has also made trips to Lebanon (1982, 1983, 1984); to Iran (1985) and Iraq (1986, 1987); and 11 trips into Cambodia over the past five years. For relaxation he has also tried BASE parachuting — jumping off bridges, cliffs, and buildings.



to. Good boots — the right ones for the terrain you're going to. Some trips can take three months, and there isn't room to carry a spare pair, so you've got to have boots to last. Clothing — again, mostly ex-military, mostly loose and baggy as opposed to tight and constrictive and snazzy-looking. It has to be practical.

JH: Take a good compass and know how to use it — there's always the chance you might have to E & E on your own, and it's nice to know which way to go. Take a small torch. Remember that the only light you'll have at night will be from campfires, and in places where you don't have to worry about the opposition seeing you a torch can be awfully convenient. If your cameras use batteries, make sure the torch takes the same size.

KG: In terms of specialised equipment for a trip, I would talk to Nigel Gifford of Camera Care Systems in Bristol. He's always been extremely good about making up equipment at short notice. He makes kit customised for the amount of camera equipment I'm carry-

ing; it all has to fit exactly to stop things rattling around, and at the same time be comfortable and hard-wearing. And they give a first-class service.

JH: I couldn't agree more. A few years ago I visited the factory and sat down with the chief designer, and explained what I wanted in the way of a camera jacket. It needed velcro-closed pockets for two cameras on my chest where they would be immediately accessible, but wouldn't be swinging from my neck, and left my hands free when nothing was happening.

That jacket's done half a dozen very hard trips into Africa, and the only wear that shows is where a bullet clipped it. His stuff isn't cheap, but in the long run it lasts longer than anything else I've used, which makes it damn good value.

MEDICAL KITS

MI: What about a medical kit? Do you carry your own, or rely on the people you're going in with?

JH: Apart from very rare exceptions, you never rely on someone else for anything in the way of medical supplies.

On my first deep trip into Angola I carried what I thought would be the basic essentials. It turned out I had far more than the medic who was with us. Subsequently, I've gone in possibly over-prepared with drips, a wide range of antibiotics, suture kits, pain killers, antihistamines, hydrocortisone, you name it. Chances are you'll never need more than a tube of betadine and some plasters; but there's a certain peace of mind in knowing you've covered yourself for most eventualities.

KG: Absolutely — learn as much as you can about first aid, and always carry a kit —

continued on page 42

The day before making the final 30-mile march to attack the MPLA garrison at Caehingues, UNITA assault leaders gather around a freshly constructed 'mud map' of the fortified village as an intelligence officer briefs them on the expected defences and the plan of attack. Roads, footpaths, trees, other terrain features, trenches, and individual HQ, barracks, radio, infirmary, kitchen and admin buildings are all carefully defined. During the question-and-answer period which followed the UNITA junior leaders demonstrated a battle awareness which would have done credit to many Western armies. (Jim Hooper)

Captions to colour photographs overleaf:

(1) Ken Guest resting in the Cambodian lush near Toule Sap, 1986, after an all-night 'crash escape and evade' from major Vietnamese forces. Travelling with an Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS) unit trying to reach and resupply another unit holed up in thick swamp-forest, Guest was at an evening bivouac point when elements of the 2,000-odd Vietnamese troops deployed to prevent this link-up attacked. He recalls very heavy mortar, RPG and small arms fire, and a rapid departure with the loss of a great deal of kit. They moved anti-stop all night, with Vietnamese close behind and in front; this photo was taken during one of the brief halts the next day while scouts probed ahead. Guest also recalls the relative sophistication of the Vietnamese artillery which quartered the area from five bases; while shells dropping nearby were at least an indication that enemy infantry were probably not close, others timed to fall on the few water points at dusk were more worrying. Guest believes that this is one war which is escalating, unreported by most journalists, who do not enter the combat zones. (Ken Guest)

(2, 3) Angola, 1989: a UNITA crew haul and fire a Chinese-made Typ 63 107mm rocket launcher near FAPLA positions some 30km south of Namibago. (Jim Hooper)

(4) Angola, 1989: a mile north of Caehingues this MiG-23 'Flogger' of the Angolan air force was shot down by UNITA with a US-supplied Stinger SAM. Although the guerrilla movement will not admit to having this advanced weapon, it is common knowledge that they arrive via covert CIA-sponsored flights from Lumumbashi in Zaire. One UNITA Stinger operator is credited with eight confirmed MiG and Sukhoi kills. The fact that Angolan air force pilots now refuse missions over UNITA-controlled areas is ample testimony to the Stinger's effectiveness. (Jim Hooper)

(5) This, and the cover photograph, were taken during a 75-mile march by a 1,000-man UNITA force from the movement's Bié Front HQ near the Kwanza River in central Angola to attack the MPLA garrison post at Caehingues. The olive cap, shirt and trousers are of local UNITA manufacture. (Jim Hooper)

(6) Namibia, 1987: Group 'Zulu Quebec' of the South-West Africa Police COIN unit prepares to depart from its HQ at Oshakati. Note the tandem-mounted .50 Browning and 7.62mm FN CPMG on the foreground Casspir. Because of the oppressive heat the Ovambo constables generally sat around the top canopy except when a contact appeared imminent. (Jim Hooper)





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Angola, 1988: with a heavy contact occurring on a ridge line a mile to the east and Cuban-flown Mi-8 helicopters attempting to land at Canguanga four miles to the north, UNITA deputy chief-of-staff General 'Ben-Ben' calls for pre-registered 120mm mortar fire to prevent the helicopters from landing. As they orbited, a UNITA radio tuned to the Cuban air frequency picked up the voice of a MiG pilot in-bound to the target area at 10,000 feet. The threat of Stinger missiles forced a re-evaluation, however, as often occurs: by the time the flight of three MiG-23 'Floggers' arrived they had climbed to 20,000 feet, and their bombs were scattered harmlessly two miles south of the target. (Jim Hooper)



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the only time I didn't, I got wounded. In some countries you can buy morphine, pethidine, and other pain-killing drugs over the counter. If you can, do. If you can't, then get the strongest possible equivalent before leaving the UK . . . though I'd suggest that the strongest available on the commercial market in the UK won't be strong enough to sort out the wounds you may be contending with. But in most Third World countries you can get what you need.

Carry a lot of bandages to plug wounds. Carry antibiotics — antibiotic powder to dry out wounds; eye ointments; simple things like that. Plasters for cuts, because they go bad very quickly. And learn when you do and don't use pain-killers. You can kill people out of kindness by giving them the right drugs at the wrong time.

MI: That raises the question, do you offer to treat the people you are with, or keep your medical supplies for yourself? It must be a tricky choice sometimes.

JH: My advice would be, don't start playing Florence Nightingale by offering to treat the people you're with. It's always a temptation; but they have their own medical supplies. If you want to leave some with them at the end of the trip, fine; but until then, hold onto what you have.

KG: You're not a mobile field station. If you start distributing medicines too early in the trip to the right people, you can end up being hassled

by all the wrong people with minor complaints. When you carry a medical bag it's basically to treat yourself so that you're not drawing on the supplies of the people you're with.

You've also got to think seriously about food, because there will be times when the people who are around won't be able to feed you. It's always best to have an emergency stash. And that stash is there for exactly that purpose — you keep it for emergencies. If you happen to be travelling with another journalist you try to work on a buddy-buddy basis, looking after each other, and your supplies are strictly for yourselves. The same applies to water.

PARTNERS: PROS AND CONS

MI: This is the first time you've mentioned working with another journalist. Is it something you would recommend?

JH: Personally, I've never gone on a trip with another journalist. There are times when it might be advisable, and certainly easier. But finding someone with the same area of interest, who's available to go at the same time as you are, can often be difficult. Unless you partner up with someone who knows the scene and has the experience, it could be a recipe for disaster.

My biggest concern has always been the thought of

taking someone along who can't keep up, or decides he doesn't like the heat, or the food, or the people — and suddenly all my effort would be going up in smoke. It generally takes a long trip to gain the trust of the people you're with, and if a partner you've asked them to accept turns out to be a whiner, the rapport and confidence which you've established is going to be endangered. Not to mention the investment you've made in the trip.

KG: On some of the more recent trips I've tended to work more often with another journalist. I know more of them now; some of them I'd be willing to travel with, others I wouldn't have along under any circumstances at all. It's advisable, where possible, to travel with a companion who can look after you. If you're working in extremely remote areas where medical resources can be non-existent, then the attraction of having someone along so that you can watch out for each other is obvious. In a contact scenario, too, it gives you twice the number of eyes on the ground in those critical periods.

I wouldn't advise travelling with amateurs. If you travel with someone who has the wrong psychological attitude to the area you're in, or the wrong reaction, it causes you tremendous problems. It creates an 'us and them' relationship, and that's one thing

you have to get over. I've had that kind of problem once: I took someone in who wasn't psychologically prepared for what was involved. Although he had been in the military for many years, the reality that when you were in a contact the opposition were not out to frighten you, but to kill you, had never really dawned on him until we came under fire. And from that point on his total pre-occupation was exiting the country by the shortest possible route . . . which meant that he couldn't function in the rôle he was there to perform, and indeed became a major problem for the people we were with, and for me, because we basically had to nurse him back to safety.

THE SHARP END

MI: Tell us some of the things that stand out from your memories of the wars you've covered.

KG: That's a difficult one . . . there are so many lasting impressions. Certainly, the long marches — long night marches when you're very fatigued, marches when there were problems over water, over food, problems with the opposition — some of the trips I've made into Cambodia stand out in that way. They were frankly terrifying, in that from the moment when you crossed the border anything could go wrong, and quite often did. There was constant pressure all the time . . . I remember the

smell and the sense of being in the jungle when I was with those people.

Of course, a lot of the contacts stand out too . . . ambushes in Afghanistan — ambushing and being ambushed, and how very different it felt to be on the receiving end . . . The wounded, and the problems of getting them out . . . But against that side of it, the silhouetted figures moving against starlight — all very romantic stuff in many ways.

JH: I'd have to say, the boredom! There are so many times when you just sit, waiting to move and not knowing what's really going on: absolutely maddening. Certainly, too, the fatigue, when *everything* hurts and all you want to do is stop for a rest. The fear leading up to an attack, and having to deal with it privately . . . the fear in the middle of a contact, and getting on with your job of taking pictures and at the same time thinking you have to be

totally nuts for putting yourself there . . . The agony of watching someone die, someone you'd been talking with only minutes before — it's at moments like that when the horror and waste of war really hit you.

MI: You must get fed up with being asked this, I realise, but we can't avoid it — what was your most frightening experience? The time when you came closest to never coming out again?

KG: I guess the most vivid memory is a Mujahideen

ambush attempt against a Soviet convoy about 15 miles outside Kandahar, which went very badly wrong as a result of mistiming. We were just getting into position when the convoy arrived earlier than expected — and the first few guys to get in place opened fire while the rest of us were still deploying. It was the armoured front of the column which initially came under fire, rather than the soft-skinned in the centre. The effect was rather like baiting a bear . . .

With a great deal of relish the front of the convoy came off the road and proceeded to

Left:

Angola, 1988: Making efficient use of available resources, UNITA engineers adapted this Russian KPV 14.5mm heavy machine gun to a British Land Rover. Originally designed as an anti-aircraft weapon, the KPV is excellent for long range support or harassing fire. This crew wait in dense cover for an advancing Cuban-advised MPLA brigade near Cuenca on the Benguela railway. (Jim Hooper)

Below:

Angola, 1988: Mi-8/17 'Hip' helicopter gunship destroyed by UNITA warriors at Munhanga near the Benguela railway line. The two-man Cuban crew were killed. Since the beginning of the present 14-year-old conflict in Angola UNITA has accounted for over 200 MPLA aircraft, from Antonov An-2 'Cubs' to Tupolev Tu-76 'Gandul' heavy transports. (Jim Hooper)





Angola, 1989: Remains of a Russian-made T-55 tank after being hit by either a TOW or a Milan wire-guided missile; the turret was blown 40 metres away. (Jim Hooper)

pursue us in tanks and BMPs. They also got rapid support from six Mi-24 Hinds, which scrambled out of Kandahar and began flying figure-eight patterns above us and scything down the trees with their 'gatling guns' . . . In Kandahar the main industry is raisins, and they plant their vines in watrens of six-foot-deep trenches. Well, we found ourselves running around in this trench system very closely pursued by ground troops and gunships. Eventually, some of the BMPs became stuck in the trenches; their companions were reluctant to leave them trapped and exposed to RPG fire, so all of them stopped and gave static support fire, while the Mi-24s stayed above to keep us at bay. Thankfully, they were unaware that we were much too busy running to think of taking aggressive action . . . In the confusion we finally managed to get away.

JH: (Laughing) Well, I'm delighted to say that I haven't anything to compare with that! Just seeing the video that Ken shot of a Hind parked a few hundred feet above him, and hearing the 'gatlings' cut-

ting loose, was enough to give me the vapours.

My own recollection of being caught on the short end was in early '87 just south of the Angolan border, when I was accompanying a predominantly black South-West African Police counter-insurgency unit. We'd camped a hundred metres or so south of a small base. I remember one of the men noting the full moon and mentioning that conditions were ideal for a 'tev' — the local slang term for a SWAPO night mortar attack. Well, the fact of the matter was that a group of about 30 insurgents were already in position less than a mile away with two 82mm mortars and three 60s. They hit us around 0330 hours next morning.

I remember waking up when the first couple of bombs hit, and seeing streams of tracer coming through the trees. I rolled off my cot still in my sleeping bag, and tried very hard to make myself extremely thin. The ground was hard — ideal for mortars — and there was no place to hide. We had all five tubes on us for almost 15 minutes; and we were also getting rifle grenades, and RPG airbursts, so part of the attacking force had to be closer than 500 metres. At one point an 82mm landed less than five metres from me.

There was this enormous orange flash that rolled over me, inflating my sleeping bag like a balloon for an instant. My left forearm went numb; I thought it was from the concussion — I didn't realise that I'd been hit until after it was all over. The same round killed one chap outright and wounded five others, one of whom died later. It shredded the cot I'd rolled off, and put half a dozen fragments through my camera bag, which was on the ground beside me.

They dropped about 150 rounds on us. Within 15 metres of where I'd been we found three rifle grenades and five mortar bombs which hadn't gone off. We ended up with two dead and 15 wounded. I was mighty lucky.

MI: What would you say were the biggest problems associated with your line of work?

KG: As a freelance — persuading people to put money up front so that I can go. Quite often you have to do trips at your own expense, and hope to sell enough to cover the costs after the event. And after the event, the cost is something that people are very reluctant to look at, when they're considering what they're going to pay you. Ideally, you get them to put money up front to cover those expenses.

It isn't a business that's going to bring in a lot of money. People think you must get very well paid because you're doing a dangerous job. In fact you'll make more money working in London filming fashion than you'll ever do filming wars at the back of beyond. But it's not as interesting.

MI: Have the two of you ever worked together?

JH: No — but that's for a number of reasons. I've only been at this about half the time Ken has, so I'm just now getting past the amateur stage. Also, we specialise in entirely different parts of the world. We've occasionally discussed doing a trip together, but our schedules never seem to overlap.

KG: Inevitably, at some point our paths will cross. Among professionals there's no hostility or animosity. When you're dealing with professionals — people whose lives are going to depend on the information you pass on — you give them good information. There is a closed-ranks stand against outsiders whom we feel are going to be a nuisance, or create problems for us. There are times when you may deprive people of information if you feel it's in their best interests not to get involved. It's not a game. It is a very serious business. **MI**

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